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Abstract 
Over the past decade, India has become the world‘s largest arms importer. During the 
Cold War, India bought arms mostly from the Soviet Union, but now it is increasingly 
buying from other suppliers. The Russia-India defense trade relations are not as bleak 
as often presented, however, as Russia supplies highly sensitive arms and technology. 
Likewise, the USA-India defense trade relations do have weaknesses, as the USA still 
has strict export controls on high-tech arms, technology, and post-export use of the 
arms. This thesis provides a holistic overview of all the motivations India has to buy 
from specific suppliers. All the different choices can be traced back to one larger 
theme. As India grows, it wants to improve the domestic capacity, increase strategic 
autonomy, and be accepted as an equal player in the worldwide arena. To do so, New 
Delhi needs to become independent and decrease the leverage that often comes with 
arms supplies. Developing its own industry, diversifying suppliers, avoiding countries 
that trade for ulterior motives, improving multilateral relations, and joining global 
export control regimes are some of the strategies India has used over the past two 
decades to achieve those goals. 
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1 Introduction 
For people keeping an eye on the international arms trade market, it has become 
obvious that India has emerged as a major player. The country is now the greatest 
arms importer in the world.
1
 This is a relative new development, as India reached this  
position for the first time in 2007 and has kept that position since 2009. Logically, this 
has attracted the attention of arms sellers all over the world, which has led to new 
suppliers for India. This thesis will take a closer look at that development. While India 
was a loyal purchaser of Soviet weaponry in the Cold War and the 1990s, it is now 
increasingly buying from other states. Israel and the West in particular have risen as 
important new arms merchants. While there is a lot of writing discussing issues of 
procurement in India, especially from the perspective of the military, there is no 
substantial academic research looking specifically at India‘s suppliers. The existing 
research is often descriptive, or only focused on one explanation, rather than analyzing 
the situation systematically. This thesis will therefore attempt to fill that gap and 
answer the following questions: 
What are India’s motivations for choosing its arms suppliers?  
How have these motivations changed between 1970 and 2014? 
Hartley identifies six different choices in arms procurement decisions: What to buy, 
whom to buy from, how to buy, when to buy, who makes the choices , and how to 
regulate.
2
 While they are all interwoven and affect each other, this thesis focuses on at 
the second choice: whom to buy from. This is done in order to give a holistic in-depth 
overview on this issue. Common topics in the procurement debate, such as 
government-military relations and corruption, will not be discussed. To answer the 
question of how India chooses whom to buy from, one also needs to look at why 
countries are willing to sell to India. Arms trade is a two-way street, and importing 
choices cannot be analyzed without also analyzing exporting choices.  
                                                 
1
 Sushant Singh, ―SIPRI data shows India world‘s biggest arms importer at three times of China‖, The Indian 
Express, March 16, 2015, accessed July 4, 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-
remains-worlds-biggest-arms-importer-sipri/. 
2
 Keith Hartley, ―The arms industry, procurement and industrial policies,‖ in Handbook of defence economics, 
ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), 1161-1167, accessed July 5, 2015,    
doi:10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02033-3.  
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Selling arms is a way to exert influence, and is strongly affected by political and 
strategic considerations. Neumann writes: ―The global defense industrial sector is a 
remarkably accurate indicator of the stratification of power in the post–Cold War 
international system.‖3 Arms trade is thus very interesting to study in the context of 
peace and conflict studies, as it is an expression of power and strategic relations.  
India‘s growing importance and the increasing significance of the Asian strategic 
theater make India‘s arms purchases an excellent topic of study. By studying arms 
supplier patterns, much can be learned about international relations. Finally, arms 
trade is secretive and lacks transparency. Neither precise data on the volume, financial 
value, or details of arms transfers is made public, nor on political considerations from 
governments about arms trade decisions. This thesis is therefore an attempt to bring 
more clarity to and understanding of this subject. The focus is on arms trade, with 
India as a case study, instead of on India with arms trade as a case study.  
After discussing the methodology, I shall present the historiographical debate on 
India‘s arms suppliers and discuss the facts about Indian arms trade, as presented by 
different data sources. I shall give the background on India‘s political situation and 
strategic choices to give context to its motivations for buying arms. I will then explain 
several theoretical considerations. The bulk is the analysis of India‘s situation, divided 
by different relevant aspects. I will conclude by synthesizing these motivations.  
On a final note, I would like to state that this thesis was finished in July 2015. 
Anything occurring from August 2015 onward has not been included in the analysis. 
 
                                                 
3
 Stephanie Neuman, ―Defense industries and global dependency‖, Orbis 50 (2006): 429, accessed July 5, 2015, 
doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2006.04.004.  
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2 Methodology 
This thesis focuses on trade in conventional weapons. It excludes other weapon types  
such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which are defined as nuclear, 
radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. Conventional weapons are different 
from WMD, because they also have legitimate uses by the government, military, 
police, and civilians.
4
 Arms control of conventional weapons is thus dissimilar too, 
and trade in WMD is severely restricted. WMD are studied more, while conventional 
weapons are also very deadly, so it is relevant to pay more attention to conventional 
weapons. Dual-use goods, which have both civilian and military purposes , are also 
excluded, as the strategic impact and the controls are different. Systematic data about 
trade in dual-use goods is also not available. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) 
are excluded as well. Strategic considerations play a smaller role in SALW trade, as 
SALW production requires lower military-technological capabilities.
5
 In India, states 
procure SALW independently, and they have different procurement procedures and 
motivations than the union government.
6
 Included in the data used in this thesis are 
components and spares, while in the discussion technology, service, repairs, etc. , are 
covered as well. These aspects are essential parts of arms trade deals, and can 
influence decisions for suppliers.
7
  
So, what influences the patterns of arms trade? In his historiographical article on arms  
trade research, Kinsella identifies the main theories that have attempted to  explain 
arms trade.
8
 He identifies descriptive, explanatory, and normative theories on arms 
trade, but this thesis will only include explanatory theories, to limit the scope to why 
India imports from certain suppliers. None of these theories mention India more than 
in passing, so the application of the theory to India is my contribution. I include one 
                                                 
4
 Rachel Stohl and Suzanne Grillot, The international arms trade (Cambrige: Polity Press, 2009), 2. 
5
 David Kinsella, ―The arms trade,‖ in The handbook on the political economy of war, ed. Christopher Coyne 
and Rachel Mathers. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 223.  
6
 Aaron Karp and Rajesh Rajagopalan, ―Small arms and the Indian state: A century of procurement and 
production,‖ Small Arms Survey Issue Brief 4 (2014), 2, accessed July 5, 2015, http://www.india-
ava.org/fileadmin/docs/pubs/IAVA-IB4-small-arms-of-indian-state.pdf. 
7
 Jurgen Brauer, ―Arms industries, arms trade and developing countries,‖ in Handbook of defence economics, 
ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), 977, accessed July 5, 2015,    
doi:10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02030-8. 
8
 Kinsella, ―The arms trade,‖  215. 
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theory based on economics, while the others are based on political science.  It is 
important to study arms trade from a political perspective, as trade in defense goods is 
not free at all. Many companies have national monopolies, and the number of buyers  
is limited. Governments either outright own defense companies or have strong control 
over private companies. To win tenders, foreign governments diplomatically 
campaign for their private companies.
9
 Arms are exported only after explicit 
government approval, due to the strong strategic value.
10
 This subject will thus be 
analyzed mostly on a country level instead of a company level.  
As there is no substantial amount of academic research on arms trade, I supplement 
that with newspaper articles, foreign policy analyses, reports from defense research 
institutes, and reports from the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India. 
They are all subject to source criticism. As an example, when reading articles written 
by (former) employees of the military, it must be kept in mind that the military has a 
difficult relation with the Indian bureaucracy and Indian Defence Research and 
Development Organisation (DRDO).
 11
 That is sometimes reflected in the analysis.
12
 
For instance, Indian Defence Review, a publication largely run by military personnel, 
regularly writes about how the ―arms mafia‖ controls procurement. The mafia is 
supposedly entrenched in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), DRDO and industry, and 
purposefully hinders acquisition for the army.
13
  
The Handbook of Defense Economics states that the two most respected resources on 
arms trade are the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) arms 
trade databases and the World Military Expenditure and the Arms Trade (WMEAT), 
compiled by the Bureau of Verification and Compliance of the US State 
                                                 
9
 Ashley Tellis, Dogfight (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2010): 6, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf. 
10
 María García-Alonso and Paul Levine, ―Arms trade and arms races: A strategic analysis‖, in Handbook of 
defence economics, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), 948-951, accessed July 5, 
2015, doi:10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02029-1. 
11
 Bibhu Prasad Routray, ―Armed forces versus technologists in India‘s military modernisation,‖ Defence 
studies 13 (2013): 37-43, accessed July 5, 2015, doi: 10.1080/14702436.2013.774962. 
12
 Kaushik Kapisthalam, ―What‘s behind the DRDO bashing?‖ The Rediff Special, January 19, 2005, accessed 
July 4, 2015, http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/jan/20spec1.htm.  
13
 See for instance Prakash Katoch, ―OROP – diminutive in deeper malaise,‖ Indian Defence Review, May 25, 
2015, accessed July 5, 2015, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/orop-diminutive-in-deeper-malaise/ or 
repeated occurrences in Indian Defence Review, ed. J. Balwa (New York: Lancer, 2015). 
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Department.
14
 The 2014 report of WMEAT only goes up to 2011 and is not as 
detailed, as most information is aggregated on a regional level. Most of the data used 
thus comes from SIPRI.
15
  There are a few other sources, but as I do not have access 
to historical and global data they will be used incidentally. Chapter 3 discusses the 
data on India‘s arms sales in depth and shows where and why data conflicts. 
SIPRI offers a database with all international arms transfers since 1950, consisting of 
two parts. The Arms Trade Register lists all major conventional weapon transfers  by 
year, weapon system, supplier, and recipient. It includes aircraft, air defense systems, 
anti-submarine warfare weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, 
sensors, satellites, ships and mounted turrets. It includes transfers between countries, 
rebel forces, and international organizations, destined for armed forces, paramilitary 
forces, and intelligence agencies. The Arms Transfers Database includes all transfers 
by country (suppliers and/or recipients) or weapon category, sorted by the year the 
arms are delivered. It measures the volume of transfers by calculating the Trend-
Indicator Value (TIV). It does not cover the financial value of the sales prices, as 
those are often obscured. Weapons can be given for free to allies and may include 
munitions, training, spares, etc., through offset arrangements or financing deals. The 
financial value therefore only partially covers the real value of weapons.
16
 Global 
annual inflation on arms prices is 12–15 percent, so that makes historical comparison  
of financial values difficult.
17
 SIPRI takes the known unit-production costs of a core 
group of weapons and uses that to calculate the transfer of military resources instead 
of the financial value. If the production cost is unknown, the weapon is compared to 
the core group based on size and performance (weight, speed, range and payload), 
type of electronics, loading or unloading arrangements, engine, tracks or wheels, 
armament and materials, and production years. Refurbished weapons are valued as 66 
percent of a new weapon, while used weapons are valued as 40 percent of a new 
                                                 
14
 Brauer, ―Arms industries,‖ 944-947.  
15
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ―SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,‖ accessed July 4, 2015, 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/armstransfers. 
16
 Ibidem,  978.  
17
 Gurmeet Kanwal, ―India‘s defense budget is inadequate for military modernization,‖ Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, March 12, 2015, accessed July 20, 2015, http://csis.org/publication/indias-defense-
budget-inadequate-military-modernization. 
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weapon. This way, a common unit is created that remains stable over time and 
between countries. The TIV is adjusted for inflation and presented in constant 1990 
USD.
18
 SIPRI uses a variety of sources but requires them to be open source.
19
 The 
choice to use the TIV instead of the financial value is sometimes criticized,
20
 but 
generally the data is well regarded, including by the Indian government. Since this 
paper is a historical comparison, and financial values get inflated due to political 
alliances, SIPRI data will be used throughout; keep in mind that it does not show the 
financial value. I often process the raw data that SIPRI provides for clarity or 
statistical tests. The source will then state: ―Adaptation of SIPRI Arms Trade 
Register/Transfers Database.‖ When discussing prices, I use dollars, as all 
international databases use dollars as well. Different articles often give different prices  
for arms, so if there are conflicting sources, I use the price SIPRI states in the Arms 
Transfers Register. 
The historical analysis of  this thesis starts at 1970. This includes the developments  
that led up to the 1971 war between India and Pakistan and the 1971 Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. That treaty facilitated arms trade for 
friendship prices with the Soviet Union. When speaking of the Cold War, I refer to the 
period between 1970 and 1991. An intermediary period lasted from 1992 to 1997, as 
purchasing patterns were volatile, mainly due to instability in post-Soviet countries. 
The current period of arms trade lasts from 1998 to now. I choose 1998 for two 
reasons. In 1998 India became a nuclear power and assumed a different position in 
international relations. This affected India‘s military capabilities and priorities and 
how other countries, both adversaries and friends, perceived it. The second reason is 
the fact that the 1999 Kargil war led to military modernization. The modernization, 
combined with economic growth, skyrocketed defense capital acquisition. This thesis 
will mainly look at developments in the present period but compare them to the 
                                                 
18
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ―SIPRI Arms Transfers Database – Methodology,‖ 
accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background. 
19
 It uses newspapers, monographs, industry information, TV broadcasts, internet publications, defense papers, 
the UN Register of Conventional Arms, notifications to parliaments on arms transfers, national and regional 
reports on imports and exports, defense budget documents and parliamentary records. 
20
 G. Balachandran, ―Time to ban import of lopsides opinions on Indian defence,‖ The Pioneer, November 8, 
2014, accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/time-to-ban-import-of-lopsided-
opinions-on-indian-defence.html. 
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situation in the past to get a better understanding on the causes of the changes.  
Overall, it has to be noted that primary sources are sparse— both pertaining to raw 
numbers and motivations.
21
 Data used in this thesis will therefore be suboptimal, but, 
unfortunately, that is the best there is. Official government data is scarce and lacks 
information on motivations for suppliers, as that is considered  sensitive to national 
security. The archives of the Indian parliamentary debates and written questions, 
which were originally meant to be a source, too, are of limited use, as the government 
is very hesitant to release details to the public. The lack of information is a recurring 
problem in this thesis and in arms trade research in general. 
                                                 
21
 García-Alonso and Levine, ―Arms trade and arms races,‖ 944.  
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3 The debate on India’s arms imports 
In work on India‘ arms imports , the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2005 is 
often described as a turning point. It has been claimed ever since that India and the 
USA are growing closer, and that India and the USA are ―natural partners,‖22 as the 
post-Cold War systemic reality dictates ―US preponderance.‖23 Mohan wrote in 2006 
that India should join the ―political West,‖ as it would benefit the USA and India since 
they have shared interests.
24
 The USA can help India rise, and India is  a great balance 
against China.
25
 Between 2011 and 2013, India spent more on US arms than on 
Russian arms for the first time ever. This all suggests that India is forging new ties 
with the USA, leaving Russia behind. Economic growth and the rise of China have 
brought the USA and India together, both economically and strategically. They are 
natural allies against China, so, of course, India now buys its arms from the USA 
instead. I want to find out to what extent this is true. To do so, I shall first present the 
historiographical debate on this subject, and follow up with a discussion on the 
different figures that are available on India‘s arms imports.  
3.1 Historiography 
There is little work offering an overview on the choices for all the different suppliers. 
Pant wrote in 2008 how strong economic growth made an increase in arms acquisition 
possible. India‘s bigger budget for arms procurement has attracted Western 
governments and industries. Russia is, according to Pant, the most serious defense 
partner, but their relations have come under strain because India desires smart 
weaponry, which Russia cannot provide. Russia‘s excellent defense relations with 
China are also objectionable to India. India wants to diversify and reduce reliance on 
                                                 
22
 Sadanand Dhume, ―Failure 2.0,‖ Foreign Policy, March 16, 2012, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/16/failure-2-0/. 
23
 Harsh Pant, The US-India nuclear pact: Policy, process, and great power politics (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 21, accessed July 20, 2015, doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198073963.001.0001. 
24
 Raja Mohan, ―India and the balance of power,‖ Foreign Affairs 85 (2006): 18, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20032038.pdf. 
25
 Evan Feigenbaum, ―India‘s rise, America‘s interest: The fate of the U.S.-Indian partnership,‖ Foreign Affairs 
89 (2010): 77, accessed July 5, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699852. 
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Russia after extended delays in arms supplies. India‘s ties with Israel have grown 
stronger, as Israel specializes in upgrading Russian equipment and is willing to 
transfer technology. Israel has replaced France and the UK as a supplier. Finally, India 
has grown closer to the USA, although Pant does not state a clear reason.
26
 This 
analysis is interesting but only a few pages long and written in 2008, so this subject 
can use expansion and modernization. Gupta wrote in 2012 that Russia‘s tardiness in 
delivering spares, concerns about the quality of equipment, and the lack of friendship 
prices made India want to look elsewhere. The Indo-USA Civil Nuclear Agreement 
(2005) allowed the USA to build up a strategic relation, including weapon transfers. 
US weapons strengthen India‘s position in South Asia.27 Matthews and Lozano state 
that India is changing suppliers in search of new weaponry and to diversify. They 
predict that US involvement will grow, but Russia will stay on top because of its 
entrenchment within India‘s production facilities.28 
There is more work on arms procurement in India in general. The majority focuses on 
another of the six aspects of procurement, as described by Hartley. There is a lot of 
material on the problems in the procurement process, which will be discussed in the 
chapter on the domestic industry. Other subjects are, for instance, the (lack of) 
strategic choices behind procurement,
29
 what India is buying to modernize,
30
 or how 
the government-military relations affect procurement.
31
 A systematic analysis of 
suppliers is lacking. Enough is written about bilateral relations with the USA, Russia, 
and Israel, but other countries are neglected. In fact, while searching for literature I 
even found a gap in work about India‘s defense trade relations with powers such as 
the UK, Italy and France. A holistic multilateral approach is missing. 
                                                 
26
 Harsh Pant, ―India‘s arms acquisition: devoid of a strategic orientation,‖ in The global arms trade: A 
handbook, ed. Andrew Tan (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 68-71. 
27
 Amit Gupta, Global security watch: India (Santa Barbara: Prager, 2012), 27-35. 
28
 Ron Matthews and Alma Lozano, ―India‘s defence acquisition and offset strategy,‖ in India’s military 
modernization: Challenges and prospects, ed. Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeet Pardesi (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
29
 Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without aiming: India’s military modernization (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2010).  
30
 Deba Mohanty, Arming the Indian arsenal (New Delhi: Rupa, 2009). 
31
 Routray, ―Armed forces versus technologists.‖  
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A final weakness in the debate is the use of data. Primary sources are used sparingly. 
If data is used, there is generally only one source, and no calculations are done with 
the data. The lack of data makes me question the validity of some of the underlying 
assumptions. I attempt to make up for these gaps in the historiography by offering a 
holistic approach on all supplier choices, including theory, multiple data sources, 
statistics and new explanations. I thus synthesize a wide variety of explanations into 
one overarching supplier choice strategy. 
3.2 Primary sources 
There are several data sources on India‘s arms imports, and there are stark differences  
between them. I will start with a presentation of the SIPRI Arms Trade Database. 
Figure 3.1 shows that there has been a sharp decline in the volume of Russian arms 
since 2012, while the USA has supplied more since 2006, and Israel since 1997. 
Figure 3.2 shows each country‘s share of India‘s total imports. As Indian spending on 
arms has risen substantially, it is essential to look at the relative importance of 
suppliers. Russian imports have hovered between 50 and 85 percent of all imports 
since 1970, with dips in 1992–1994, 2005 and 2013-2014. The timeframe is short, so 
one should be hesitant to conclude anything definite. However, Russia‘s current share 
is one of the lowest since 1970, while the US share is record-high. Tables of the TIV 
and shares per five years (lustrum) can be found in the Annex, to improve legibility. 
Lustrums are more useful to analyze trends, as arms purchases are volatile and can 
vary widely from year to year. 
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Figure 3.1 Indian arms imports per country in mill. 1990 USD in TIV 1970-2014 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 
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Figure 3.2 Share in Indian arms imports per country in mill. 1990 USD in TIV 1970-2014 
Source: Adjustment of SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 
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Official figures are sparse. The Indian government is not very open about its imports, 
but made a public statement in 2014 on how much it had imported from various 
suppliers between 2011 and 2013. Those figures rank suppliers differently than SIPRI 
does. They say that the USA exported to India for 5.3 billion USD (37.9 percent of all 
imports), while Russia exported for 4.1 billion USD (29.4 percent); France for 1.9 
billion USD (14.0 percent); and Israel for 547 million USD (3.9 percent). In total, 
India imported for 13.9 billion USD.
32
 The remainder was from Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland, and the UK. Statements that the USA has surpassed Russia are often 
based on these numbers.  
All sources on arms trade calculate their data differently, which explains the variance. 
As explained, the financial value does not reflect the volume. Sources also differ on 
the definition of arms, like whether SALW, munitions, trucks, IT, or chemical agents 
are included. Some include extras like training, service, and maintenance. They differ 
on the types of recipients included, like intelligence and homeland security. The 
sources can be the industry, customs, or classified government documents. The year 
can be when a weapon is ordered, a contract is signed, the sale is approved (by either 
government), the license is approved, money is released to the industry, or arms are 
delivered. Arms can take years to deliver, and delivery itself might be spread out over 
multiple years. Financing deals are often complex, and offset might be included, 
obscuring the financial value. One can use the worth of approved licenses or of actual 
goods transferred, and the latter is often a fraction of the former. Finally, official data 
is less trustworthy, as arms imports are a matter of national security. It is unclear how 
it is calculated by the MoD. The government report mentions the US Boeing P-8I 
Neptune as an example of something imported between 2011 and 2013. The deal for 
that was approved by both countries in 2009, and the first deliveries started in 2012 
and will continue until 2015.
33
 That suggests that the MoD measures deliveries, even if 
not completed.  
                                                 
32
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Another source is the annual report on global defense economics by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). This source states that between FY 2011/12 and 
FY 2013/14, the USA received 6 billion USD (39 percent,) out of a total of 15.6 
billion USD; Russia 4.7 billion USD (30 percent); France 2.2 billion USD (14 
percent); and Israel 626 million USD (4 percent).
34
 They do not publish these figures 
consistently, so I cannot make a historical comparison. IHS Jane’s Defence publishes 
figures on the money released to the industry for deliveries of conventional weapons, 
but they are private, so I cannot use them. According to Jane‘s, India bought for 30 
billion USD from Russia between 2001 and 2013; 20 billion USD from France; 15 
billion USD from USA; 10 billion USD from Israel; and 4 billion USD from the UK.
35
 
While most reports show the same trend for countries, although to a different degree, 
two countries are hard to assess. France‘s share of the volume declined, but the volume 
and financial value increased. Jane‘s says that between 2001 and 2013, France sold for 
67 percent of Russia‘s financial value, while it sold for 2 percent of the volume 
according to SIPRI. As France and India signed multiple important arms deals, like 
Scorpène submarines and Mirage-2000 fighter aircraft, and the financial value is so 
high, I consider France a rising supplier. The UK is even more difficult to judge. Over 
the same period, the UK sold for 266 percent of France‘s volume, but 20 percent of the 
price, according to Jane‘s. I tentatively conclude that UK arms exports have gone 
down since the end of the Cold War, based on secondary literature, and the fact that 
major arms deals have been limited to one deal with follow-ups and spares for Hawk-
100 trainer jets.
36
  
India is strongly reliant on foreign armaments. In 2011, 70 percent of all India‘s 
procurement was imported.
37
 According to IISS, imports made up 43 percent of total 
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procurement in FY 2013/2014, excluding components and subsystems. However, 
indigenous arms are defined as having a minimum of 30 percent domestic content, so 
the real value of imports is likely higher.
38
 
The only work on Indian arms imports I have found that uses multiple data sources 
and discusses the discrepancy is an article from Minstry. He shares the assessment that 
the USA is not a traditional supplier but has become more important on the Indian 
market without making a clear judgment on who is the most important.
39
 Despite the 
differences in data, some conclusions can be drawn about the importance of various 
suppliers. Since 1998, Russia‘s share has been declining, but it is difficult to assess 
whether its share is below the US share. The USA and Israel have become important 
players on the Indian defense market, and I tentatively add France to this list. Several 
players have seen modest rises, namely Australia, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, South Africa, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Declining suppliers are Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. I also consider the UK a declining supplier. Poland rose until 2007, and 
then disappeared from the Indian arms market. Finally, there are some countries with 
no historical defense trade ties that sold arms for a few years but then stopped. These 
are Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, and Sweden. Most countries have ups and down 
over the period of more than forty years and cannot be simply described as ―declining‖ 
or ―increasing,‖ so for greater accuracy, refer to Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 in the Annex. 
So, that leaves the question: why has this changed?  
                                                 
38
 Bikramdeep Singh, ―Defence indigenisation: Made in India, by India, for India,‖ Centre for Land Warfare 
Studies (2013): 254, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/16092657_BikramdeepSingh.pdf. 
39
 Mistry, ―US arms sales to India.‖ 
 16 
 
4 Historical and strategic background 
To figure out who India is buying from, it is important to also know something about 
India‘s security situation. In 1947 India and Pakistan became independent from Great 
Britain. This led to extensive fighting and relocation of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs 
across the new borders. Wars and skirmishes have continued ever since..
40
 Relations  
between India and Pakistan have always remained hostile, and the rivals are still 
involved in a border conflict over the region of Jammu & Kashmir.
 
The threat of the 
other looms large in the defense discourse in both countries. Even if internal security is 
more important for India  than external security as Datta-Ray says,
 41
 the internal 
security is directly threatened by Islamist terrorist attacks. India blames Pakistan for 
being lax against militant Muslim groups,
42
 and New Delhi has been on a diplomatic 
campaign to frame Pakistan as the mastermind behind terrorist attacks since the mid-
1990s.
43
 This makes dealing with Pakistan a major concern for India.  
India feels threatened not only by Pakistan but by China, with whom it has several 
border disputes in the Himalaya region. The 1962 Indo-China war led to a humiliating 
defeat for India. After that defeat, India saw China conduct its first nuclear test in 
1964, and New Delhi became hesitantly more interested in developing nuclear 
weapons. After the 1971 war with Pakistan, India conducted its first ―Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosion‖ (PNE) in 1974. As a result, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspections became intrusive and trade in nuclear materials got restricted, which halted 
further development. The nuclear program was started up again in 1989, as India felt 
more threatened by Pakistan. Pakistan‘s nuclear program started again as a response to 
India‘s nuclear program (with Chinese help), which further pushed India into 
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developing nuclear weapons. In 1998, India conducted five more nuclear tests, called 
Pokhran-II. It was presented as a defense against Chinese aggression. Beijing 
disapproved strongly, which cooled relations significantly.
44
 SIPRI estimates that India 
currently owns 90–110 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 100–120, and China 250.45  
Another result of the 1962 defeat was that India realized it needed foreign assistance. 
While formally unaligned, New Delhi cultivated good relations with Moscow, which 
was the main arms supplier. This culminated in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation, through which India got Russian arms for friendship 
prices. Relations with Washington were not as smooth, as India distrusted the USA for 
its hegemonic policies. For instance, the USA used food aid in the 1960s to exert 
influence,
46
 fought a war in Vietnam perceived as imperialistic,
47
 and supplied arms to 
Pakistan. India also resented the US stance on nuclear weapons. India considers it 
unfair that Chinese and US nuclear weapon ownership is considered stable, but not 
Indian ownership. The USA reacted much more strongly to the Soviet Union acquiring 
nuclear weapons than India reacted to China, while India‘s military position toward 
China is considerably weaker than the USA‘s position toward the Soviet Union was.48  
Current relations with China are not as hostile as with Pakistan, but China poses a 
greater threat in the long term, since China has superior conventional and nuclear 
arms. China currently prefers a stable regional environment, as that is more conductive 
to domestic economic development. India and China have been working on improving 
their defense relations through negotiations on the border disputes and a security 
dialogue.
49
 They mainly want to improve economic cooperation, and China is now 
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India‘s leading trade partner.50 On a global level, both countries oppose US hegemony, 
and they have coordinated efforts regarding climate change, trade negotiations, and the 
financial crisis. That does not mean their relations are smooth. China and Pakistan are 
very close and have an all-weather friendship, and they bond over the perception of 
India as a common enemy. China is also a major arms supplier to Pakistan.
51
 
Skirmishes occur regularly along the disputed borders in the Himalayas.
52
 China is 
improving its nuclear forces, cruise and ballistic missiles, and space and cyberspace 
warfare. Even if not directed immediately at India, they pose a major security risk.
53
 
India sees China as a bigger threat than vice versa. India feels that China betrayed 
India in 1962 and committed an act of aggression. In Beijing‘s eyes, India is not 
powerful enough yet to pose a threat. India is seen mainly as a regional player due to 
India‘s preoccupation with Pakistan.54 Because China does not feel threatened by 
India, there is no buildup of a Chinese military at the borders, and India and China are 
not spiraled into an arms race in the Himalaya region.
55
 However, India is also 
concerned about Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China is 
developing harbors and naval bases in South and South-East Asia and investing 
significantly in East Africa.
56
 This tactic is called the ―String of Pearls ,‖ which can be 
tightened around India‘s neck.57 China is thus always in mind when procuring arms. 
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4.1.1 India’s military and strategic culture 
There were several developments that kick-started military modernization in India, as  
they revealed problems in the Indian army. The latest war between India and Pakistan 
was the 1999 Kargil war, which was a response to the intrusion of Pakistani militants 
in the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir.. India achieved victory, but the war 
highlighted substantial problems with India‘s army. While India won, it should not 
have been a challenge, because the war took place inside India and Pakistan had little 
international support, even from China.
58
 A second influence was the October 2001 
terrorist attack in India by Pakistani Islamist terrorist organizations. India threatened 
Pakistan over its support to militants, but the threat was not credible, as the Indian 
mobilization was so slow Pakistan could counter-mobilize, and international support 
dwindled. Indian troops also lacked strategic surprise and offensive power. This is 
partially why the situation did not escalate into war.
59 
Similarly, a major reason for not 
launching a counter-attack after the 2008 Mumbai attacks by Pakistani militants was 
that top army commanders recommended against it, because the armory was 
inadequate and obsolete.
60
 This pushed India into modernizing, expanding its weapon 
platforms, and updating procurement procedures.
61
 India also increased its military 
expenditure,, from 18.8 billion USD in 1990 to 23.1 billion USD in 1998 and 49.1 
billion USD in 2013. However, expenditure has consistently hovered between 2.5 
percent and 3.5 percent of India‘s GDP, as the economy grew too.62 These are the 
major causes for India‘s expanded weapon-procurement program.  
Another influence on the military modernization is India‘s changing position in the 
world. In the late 1980s India‘s economy transitioned from state socialism to 
neoliberalism, and that has led to strong economic growth. India is set to become a 
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bigger economy than Russia in 2015, and to surpass Brazil in 2016.
63
 With a stronger 
economic position often comes a stronger political position, but India has been hesitant 
about that so far. Ganguly and Fidler said in 2010 that India is not positioning itself as 
a great power and is not shaping its strategic environment proactively, one of the 
hallmarks of a great power according.
64
 However, under the new prime minister, 
Narendra Modi, elected in May 2014, India has been starting to play a more active 
role. India increased engagement with its neighbors under its Look East Policy in 
1991, and is now turning this into an Act East Policy. India has for instance spoken out 
on the security situation in the South-China Sea.
65
 It is questioned whether this active 
role will include military power. Pant says India is  not able to use force effectively, as 
the country is uncomfortable using force because its history was determined by the 
foreign great powers. New Delhi has not been able to organize and arm the army 
effectively. This affects its diplomatic position.
66
 However, there are also ways to 
project power that do not include force, for which arms acquisitions are needed. These 
include securing sea lanes of communication, non-combatant evacuation operations,
 
humanitarian relief, and peacekeeping.
67
 These could be seen in action when India 
took the worldwide lead in evacuating civilians from Yemen in April 2015
68
 and when 
it competed with China to lead the international aid effort in Nepal after the earthquake 
in April 2015.
69
  India has increased such efforts to project power and is carefully 
increasing its global engagement. It is a country on the rise. 
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This is a departure from India‘s old strategic policy. India played a big role in the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) and has always put great importance on staying out of 
great power politics. Neutrality, independence, and restraint have always been 
important ideals for India, and that still expresses itself in foreign policy. There is an 
extensive debate on the nature of India‘s strategic culture, and whether India lacks 
strategic thought. I will try to capture some of the key opinions . Tanham argues that 
India has never possessed coherent strategic thought, because of its geographically 
isolated position, a lack of unity, the Hindu view of re-birth discouraging strategic 
foresight, and repeated invasions leading to a defensive posture..
70
 Pant considers the 
lack of institutionalization of foreign policy decision-making to be an essential factor 
as well.
71
 Ogden is convinced neutrality was born out of mistrust toward all the great 
powers after India‘s experiences with colonialism, US support to Pakistan, and the 
1962 Indo-Chino war.
72
 Basrur states that restraint has always been an ideological 
preference. Security is a political matter for Indian politicians, who made strategic 
political choices to not manage security issues.
73
 Not everyone agrees with the notion 
that India lacks strategy. Khilnani and Guha write that that assessment is based on a 
foreign idea about what great powers do, which does not necessarily apply to India.
74
 
Xinmin states that there might not be a monolithic school of strategic thought but 
multiple smaller ones due to India‘s cultural diversity. Harjeet Singh says there is 
strategic thought, but it is not centered on the Indian state or confined to the military. 
Instead, it focuses on the social structure of the country.
75
 The debate is still up on 
whether India possesses strategic thought and the causes for India‘s strategic choices . 
However, most scholars agree that maintaining autonomy has always been an 
important value for India. 
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The perceived lack of strategy also expresses itself in arms procurement. Cohen and 
Disgupta state that India‘s army is modernizing without strategic purpose.76 Pant calls  
the modernization ad-hoc and describes defense planning as lacking in strategic 
orientation.
77
 Chandramohan declares that the government allocates funds to the 
military based on operational readiness instead of a grand strategy.
78
 Mathews and 
Lozano write that acquisition programs and indigenization efforts are marked by an 
―incapacity to plan, design, implement, and manage a suitable long-term strategy.‖79  
I cannot look into the minds of the Indian government, but I do feel there is an 
overarching theme in the developments of the past years. I do not know if it is 
explicitly planned, but I can decipher a pattern in the choices for suppliers. India 
chooses to develop the domestic industry through the technology received in foreign 
imports, diversifies suppliers to balance their influence, and stays non-aligned in a 
modern way by pluralizing alignment. This is done to decrease foreign leverage, to 
become more independent, and to improve India‘s domestic growth, fitting a country 
on the rise. In the following chapters, I will explain how and why. 
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5 Theoretical models of arms trade 
This chapter discusses five different theories that explain arms-transfer patterns in the 
world, focusing on aspects that influence the choice for suppliers.  I will explain the 
workings of the theories, and then use these theories to analyze India‘s s upplier 
choices in the next chapter. 
5.1 Krause’s ladder of production 
Krause composed an influential framework on the diffusion of military technology. 
While the specific applications have been criticized, like the nature, timing, and 
implications of technological innovation, his longue dureé view of arms trade has been 
well received.
80
 Based on historical arms trade patterns from 1400 to 1972, he 
extrapolates the arms trade cycles, through which technology spreads over the world.
81
 
He categorizes countriesinto four types according to control over technology. The 
countries go from merely possessing the skill to operate a weapon (type I), to 
reproducing weapons (type II), to adapting weapons (type III), and finally to creating 
weapons (type IV). All countries want to be type IV, and they pursue that by 
purchasing arms. The skills of type I are obtained through material transfer, type II 
through design transfer, and type III through capacity transfer. Countries that supply 
weapons are sorted into three tiers. First-tier suppliers are the critical innovators that 
start technological revolutions, as they can invent and create weapons. They develop 
and export arms to gain power. Second-tier suppliers can manufacture a wide range of 
modern weapons and can adapt and modify arms, but they do not innovate. They are 
forced to choose between independence and technological competition, and that limits  
their foreign-policy options. These countries develop and export arms to obtain wealth, 
so they do not show a lot of restraint in export decisions. Third-tier suppliers are the 
copiers and reproducers. They produce weapons below current technology levels, only 
produce one or two sophisticated weapon systems, or are dependent on import of 
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critical components. They pursue victory in war. Countries are positioned on a ladder, 
rising through the tiers, increasing their control over technology. 
Bitzinger also uses Krause‘s classification of tiers. He states that nowadays second-tier 
suppliers have trouble sustaining their arms industries  because financial and 
technological requirements have increased. Second-tier producers have not achieved 
autarky but merely exchanged dependence on foreign weapons for dependence on 
foreign critical subsystems and technologies. They have not climbed the ladder to 
become a first-tier supplier. Bitzinger identifies six strategies countries employ as a 
response. They can quit the defense business, rationalize and consolidate defense 
operations, diversify the arms industry to also cover civilian products, adapt dual-use 
technology for military purposes, increase exports, and/or globalize production.
82
 
Overall, the theory suggests that the leading motivation for buying arms abroad is to 
develop an industry at home. The best supplier for a country is the one offering the 
best options to develop a domestic industry, which is usually a country of a higher 
tier.I will explore how India has moved on the ladder of production, and whether it 
buys from countries in different tiers now.  
5.2 Levine et al’s collective-action problem 
Levine et al study arms trade in an economics research group, and they made several 
important contributions. In a 2003 paper, Dunne et al found that between 1990 and 
1998 the number of arms companies shrunk significantly.
83
 After the Cold War, states‘ 
needs to buy arms domestically, or home bias, decreased, which led to increased 
competition on the international market. As the market became more open, R&D costs  
increased, which led to the concentration of the arms industry. There were many 
international mergers, which led to an increasingly transnational industry. For that 
reason, Brauer thinks countries should not be categorized into tiers. Production of 
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components gets outsourced to countries in lower tiers  — the arms-production 
periphery. A single weapon system can therefore be produced in a plethora of 
countries.
84
  
Countries export arms for both economic and strategic reasons. Countries compete 
with each other to sell arms, and with increased competition, they sell more advanced 
technology to survive on the market. There is little coordination between the exporters, 
which leads to more arms being exported, which is not good for international security. 
This is a collective-action problem: individual exports are good for the exporter, but 
other countries think the same, leading to a total negative security balance. Export 
control regimes are an attempt to solve this  and to coordinate between countries. They 
limit opportunities for recipients to play exporters against each other and prevent 
destabilizing stockpiles.
85
 I will follow Levine et al‘s logic and look at how collective 
action on the side of the supplier has influenced India‘s arms imports . 
5.3 SIPRI’s typology of suppliers 
 SIPRI‘s typology of supplier motivations distinguishes three ideal types of arms trade. 
All transfers show elements of all three, but generally one pattern dominates. The type 
of supplier influences the amount of power the supplier has over the recipient.  
The first pattern is hegemony, where arms flow from dominant to dependent powers. 
Hegemons supply arms for a specific task that is of interest to the hegemon or to 
strengthen relations with a specific group because it is strategically beneficial.  It 
usually comes with military aid and/or the free gift of weapons, to reduce competition. 
They can demand favors and withhold spares if the recipient does not comply. They 
also supply to ensure that another dominant power does not achieve hegemony, called 
pre-emptive supply. This type of supply leaves the suppliers with less leverage.  
The second pattern is industrial arms supply, which involves arms transferred for 
financial reasons. If this is the only function of arms trade, weapons will be supplied to 
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whomever can afford them. If weapons are made on a larger scale, economies of scale 
dictate the costs go down. If production occurs over a longer period of time, instead of 
only once for the government, labor productivity is higher. Exports are therefore 
important for governments to keep a healthy defense industry. It keeps R&D alive and 
costs low. Industrial patterns suggest a willingness to guarantee follow-up suppliers, 
while hegemony includes more controls and a willingness to interrupt supplies.  
Finally, there are restrictive patterns. Suppliers restrict export to avoid becoming 
involved in conflict. Arms are supplied only if the deliveries do not affect regional 
stability negatively. Recipients (potentially) involved in conflicts will not receive any 
weapons. This is done to keep a neutral image, to reduce a belligerent image (e.g. , 
Germany and Japan after the Second World War), or to preserve international order. 
Acquisition of weapons from a foreign source may create dependence. When interests 
align, this is less troublesome, but when they do not, independence is threatened. 
Suppliers might terminate a contract, or overcharge for parts or discontinue them. 
Dependence is only possible when the recipient has limited abilities to look for other 
suppliers. To avoid dependence, the recipient can establish a domestic industry and 
diversify suppliers to increase competition between suppliers.
86
 I will analyze to what 
extent India‘s suppliers now have different motivations , and how this has influenced 
India‘s dependence on certain arms suppliers. 
5.4 Kinsella’s arms trade networks 
Kinsella has a different approach. Using sociological and economic theories, he 
presents the global arms trade as a social network. He identifies three different ways to 
profit from exports. Countries profit politically, by making friends and possibly 
gaining influence on foreign policy; economically, by generating sales; and militarily, 
by making their own defense production healthier and strengthening military alliances. 
He also recognizes the prisoner‘s dilemma that Levine et al discuss, and adds that 
                                                 
86
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms trade and the third world (Uppsala: Almqvist & 
Wiksells, 1971), 17-85. 
27 
 
competition between exporters makes realization of the three profits uncertain. Based 
on Granovetter‘s social network analysis, Kinsella poses that there are social networks 
within the arms trade to solve the prisoner‘s dilemma. Social relations and structures 
between countries generate trust and discourage malfeasance, overcoming the risk of 
free-riders, and destabilizing stockpiles. Network transactions entangle actors and 
promote future interactions, stimulating interdependence. Networks also facilitate the 
transfer of non-material things, like information, training, maintenance, technical 
support, etc. These arms networks can be part of larger military relations too. The 
networks are more than just contracts, as they are ―long-term investments in mutually 
beneficial interstate relations.‖ The most significant and congruent relations are 
between countries with common foreign policy goals. Arms transfers indicate that the 
supplier is committed to the security of the recipient and that the recipient can count 
on future commitment. Increasing trust, especially through strategic relations, thus 
facilitates arms trade. Not all arms transfers show this type of commitment though.  
Kinsella calls the number of ties between actors in a network centralization. Based on 
data from 1950 to 2000, he finds that there is a trend toward decentralization of 
suppliers since 1985. This means the world has fewer big, central suppliers with a 
large number of recipients that dominate the arms market. Major suppliers (especially 
within the West) also have increasingly overlapping, non-distinct networks. The rate 
of centralization remained stable over time for recipients. This is most likely caused by 
the disappearing alliances from the Cold War. Note that Kinsella‘s centralization 
refers to the number of ties countries have, while Dunne‘s concentration refers to how 
the arms market is dominated by a few companies. Kinsella also builds upon Krause, 
finding that the role of second- and third-tier suppliers in the arms trade network is 
getting bigger. This leads to less leverage for suppliers.
87
 In a follow-up study, he finds 
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that arms trade is an indicator of ―the coalitional structure of the international system, 
with perhaps more nuance than formal alliance systems.‖88 
Åkerman and Larsson Seim combine Kinsella‘s social-network analysis with the 
Democratic Peace Theory (which states that democracies do not go to war with each 
other), and find that during the Cold War, democracies preferred to trade with 
democracies, while autocracies had an even stronger bias  for other autocracies. This is 
not the case anymore.
89
 This means that shared foreign policy considerations are based 
on other concerns now. I will look at the networks India has with its suppliers, and 
what kind of shared foreign policy considerations form the base for the current ties 
between countries. 
5.5 Harkavy’s theory on international systems  
Harkavy identifies key factors determining the characteristics of arms trade based on 
historical analysis from the Middle Ages onward. He uses these to make models of 
arms trade in the interwar (1930–1939) and postwar period (1945–1975). This leads to 
a complex web where the structures of global systems influence different aspects of 
arms trade. These influences are in turn affected by control variables. Harkavy is not 
very clear about causality and does not always describe in detail why the independent 
variables lead to the dependent variables. He states that ―a tight delineation of cause 
and effect would be difficult to achieve.‖90 The model is not statistically proven either, 
as most factors are not quantifiable. However, it has some valuable and original ideas. 
Table 5.1 shows the identified characteristics. 
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Table 5.1 The variables of arms trade as determined by Harkavy 
Independent variables Intermediary variables Dependent variables 
Polarity / alliance systems Amount of government controls Supplier markets and their behavior 
Importance of ideology  Structure of business Donor-recipient patterns 
Totality in warfare Rate of technological change Transfer modes 
Prevailing economic system  Level of autarky 
Source: Harkavy, The arms trade and international systems.  
The different international systems in the Interbellum and the Cold War period also led 
to different patterns of arms trade. The Interbellum saw moderately dispersed power 
centers; multipolar blocs; a relatively non-ideological system, mainly based on a 
balance of powers; a moderated mood regarding total war; a laissez-faire economy 
with many transnational businesses; few government controls; and fast technological 
change. This led to supplier markets with more players; multiple-client relationships 
and extensive cross-bloc arms ties; a high degree of coproduction and licensing; and a 
relatively high degree of weapons-producing independence. On the other hand, the 
postwar world saw bipolarity with two major powers; a bipolar bloc system with 
hegemonic alliances; an ideological locus of conflict; a zeitgeist of total war; state 
capitalism and state socialism dictating a controlled economy; tight government 
controls; and slow technological change. This led to more narrowly oligopolistic arms-
supplier markets (fewer players); predominantly single-client and within-bloc 
relationships; extensive coproduction and licensing agreements; and a lesser degree of 
weapons-producing independence. 
Harkavy stated in a follow-up article in 1994 that without rival blocs, industrial 
motives are the most important again for suppliers, not hegemonic ones. He also 
suggested that with the rise of new technology, a new cycle in arms productions had 
begun. Aware of the short time period that had passed, he tentatively posited that arms 
trade in the post-Cold War period not based on political alignment anymore, but 
economically motivated again, like in the Interbellum, with cross-bloc trade.
91
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This model is useful because changes in the international systems might have led to 
changes in the arms market too. I will study to what extent historical developments 
have influenced the aspects of arms trade he mentions. 
5.6 Summarizing the theories 
All theories bring forth different aspects that are influential in determining supplier 
choices. Krause mentions the importance of the diffusion of military technology, 
leading to trade motivated by the desire to build a domestic industry. Levine et al 
discuss the collective action problems, and the export control regimes that have risen 
as a result. Kinsella sees arms trade as a social network.  SIPRI discusses how the 
motivations of suppliers influence their willingness to supply arms. Finally, Harkavy 
describes the influences of international systems. The next chapter applies these 
theories to India. Suppliers are never chosen for a single reason, and all the different 
motivations in turn interact with each other. This creates an intertwined web. Any 
motivations I mention for a specific purchase are always just one of many.  
31 
 
6 India’s supplier choices 
In this chapter, I will apply the theories to present-day India, and describe key 
developments in India‘s supplier choices. The order in which I discuss the different 
influences on supplier choices is unrelated to their importance. 
6.1 Quality problems with Russian arms 
As mentioned by Pant, India has been having troubles with the quality of Russian 
arms, and that is an important reason for the decline of the Russian share. It is useful to 
look at what exactly is problematic for India. The MiG-21 is often mentioned as a 
source of frustration. This plane has been part of the Indian Air Force (IAF) since 
1963, but the aircraft has a very negative reputation in India. Between 1970 and 2013,  
more than 170 pilots and 40 civilians have been killed in MiG-21 crashes. New Delhi 
also has had difficulties in acquiring spares for it, eventually obtaining them from 
disassembled MiG-21s in Eastern Europe or producing them in Indian factories.
92
 This 
has led to Russian criticism, as those parts are unlicensed. Moscow said that those 
―fake‖ parts are the reason the MiG-21s crash.93 Withholding spares is a way a 
supplier can continue its leverage, even long after the initial purchase.  
Another issue is tardiness in deliveries. In 2008 India leased the INS Chakra II, a 
nuclear-powered submarine from Russia. It was supposed to be delivered in 2009, but 
was only handed over in 2012.
94
 India also ordered three Krivak-III/Talwar class 
frigates in 2006, two of which arrived in 2012, and the last in 2013.
95
 India and Russia 
are jointly developing the Perspective Multi-Role Fighter (PMF), previously called the 
Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), yet this project has seen years of delays and 
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cost overruns. The costs are split equally, but Russia reduced India‘s  share of the 
development work from an initial 25 percent to 13 percent. Russia does not feel 
confident in India‘s capacity to produce the PMF, while India wants to contribute 
more, to ensure all its demands are met and to improve the domestic industry.
96
 
6.1.1 Admiral Gorshkov/INS Vikramaditya 
The biggest problem was the sale of the old Soviet aircraft carrier Gorshkov. She was 
sold to India in 2004 and supposed to be refitted into a Conventional Take-Off and 
Landing carrier and delivered in 2008, but this was delayed until 2013.
97
 As she was 
under construction, the price of the deal rose from 625 million USD to 2.3 million 
USD in 2009. The original deal was that the carrier was free but India would pay for 
all the upgrades. Rosoboronexport, the Russian arms export agency, stated that they 
underestimated the costs of the upgrades, made mistakes in calculating the price, and 
were affected by rising oil prices.
98
 India was forced to accept the changes for several 
reasons. It was under time pressure, as the old carrier INS Viraat was scheduled to 
retire in 2009. Significant funds had already been sunk into the ship, China was 
retrofitting its own aircraft carrier,
99
  Russia threatened not to hand the Gorshkov over 
if India did not pay the full amount, and there were no alternatives.
100
  
During the 2009 re-negotiations over the Gorshkov price, India may not have been 
circulating rumors that it was interested in buying the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk, an US ship 
from 1961, but it was not suppressing them. This was a tactic to drive down the 
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price.
101
 New Delhi did not succeed. This shows how important it is to diversify 
suppliers, as India had very little leverage because there were no alternatives. Russia 
was behaving like a hegemon here, which is what India wants to avoid now.  
6.1.2 Reducing leverage 
To avoid similar fiascos, the DRDO is currently developing the aircraft carriers INS 
Vishal and INS Vikrant, for which it wants to use US technology.
102
 In January 2015, 
New Delhi signed an agreement with Washington in which both countries agreed they 
would ―form a working group to explore aircraft carrier technology sharing and 
design.‖103 However, this is just an agreement to form a working group to explore the 
option to share such designs, and many steps away from actually handing over such 
technology. Whether this will truly happen is a second question, as US technology 
transfer is bound by many regulations and not transferred easily.
104
 It is also unclear 
whether there is enough political will in the USA for that.
 105
 If this goes through, it 
would be significant, as it would mean the USA offered very sensitive arms 
technology, which is not the norm, as will be shown in the next chapters. 
There is a lot of frustration felt by Indian officials over tardiness, a lack of spares and 
low quality delivered by Russia, contributing to Russian leverage over Indian arms. 
This has cooled down the defense trade relations somewhat. To increase leverage, 
India is developing its own weapons and purchasing from other countries than Russia 
in order to balance the different suppliers against each other. These two developments 
are a major theme in all India‘s arms purchases. 
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6.2 Domestic industry 
Developing a strong indigenous arms industry is a priority for India. New Delhi has 
believed since independence that due to the hostile geopolitical environment, it cannot 
afford to be dependent on external suppliers. Without local arms production, India is  
susceptible to arms embargoes and coercion. Furthermore, to be truly respected as a 
great power, autarky in arms production is essential. India also considers a strong 
domestic arms industry to be beneficial for the economy. Prices would be lower, 
money could be made from exporting weapons which keeps R&D costs low, it would 
not lose money to exchange rates, and employment and technological development 
would increase. India distinguishes between self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Self-
sufficiency means having all the material resources and technical expertise to develop 
arms, while self-reliance means producing arms while allowing for import of design, 
technology, systems, and know-how.
106
 Self-sufficiency is the ultimate goal, but self-
reliance has been the practice for a long time. 
The most important part of the defense industry are the eight state-owned Defence 
Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU), which have near monopolies in their sector,
107
 
and forty-one Ordnance Factories. The private sector is small. Altogether, the private 
sector did defense work worth 800 million USD in 2010, while the state-owned 
factories did 4.5 billion USD worth of work. This makes the private sector 18 percent 
of the size of the state-owned sectors. While the rest of India‘s economy has become 
more free-market oriented, the defense sector is still rather protectionist.
108
 Officially, 
the private sector is equal, but in practice the public sector is often preferred. Private 
sector tenders are often for less sensitive and technologically advanced arms. 
There are substantial problems with the domestic industry. It is uncompetitive, overly 
ambitious, and creates low quality products. A 2006 audit of Ordnance Factories 
showed that 40 percent produced armaments of inferior quality, even though the 
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development took decades. The technological gap between local and foreign products  
has widened over the past two decades, while development costs have increased. The 
five most important weapon-development programs are all at least two to three times 
over their allocated budgets.
109
 Cohen and Dasgupta even state that the Indian military 
industry ―has not delivered a single major weapon system to the armed forces in five 
decades of existence.‖110 This has led to problems between the government, the 
military, and the DRDO. The DRDO focuses on self-reliance above all, while the 
military favors independence but prefers reliable foreign imports over inferior 
domestic production.
111
 The whole arms acquisitions process is a mess, as it is slow, 
all institutions have competing interests, and bureaucracy rules.
112
 Coordination 
between institutions or even between the armed services is barely existent. The 
military has little say in the final decisions on arms acquisitions, and the bureaucracy 
is allegedly ignorant about technical specifications and military needs.
113
 This could 
lead to arms purchased based on political considerations rather than technical 
qualifications. Problems in the industry are a reason to import arms to avoid the delays  
and quality issues, and make technology transfer a priority when buying arms. 
Many military sources claim that the political establishment is apathetic about 
indigenization,
114
 but I do not share that assessment. As an illustration, I analyzed the 
questions asked in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Parliament of India.
115
 I 
found that the Members of Parliament are consistently harping on indigenization. In 
the 235th session (23 April 2015 to 13 May 2015), the MoD answered sixty-two 
questions. Answers were categorized exclusively into different topics. There were 
twenty questions about arms procurement, three about concerns over foreign direct 
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investment (FDI), two about concerns over the quality of already imported planes, and 
one about receiving foreign technology. Of those twenty questions about arms 
procurement, ten were outright urging for indigenization and eight were highlighting 
problems with foreign purchases.
116
 Modi is also pushing to increase manufacturing in 
India with a campaign called ―Make in India.‖ Defense is at the heart of it.117 In May 
2015, the government decided for instance that all procured warships and submarines 
must be produced domestically, and foreign vendors may participate only in the design 
phase.
118
 Modi‘s foreign visits are characterized by promoting manufacturing in India, 
especially defense.
119
 It is absolutely a key concern for all stakeholders involved, and 
not only under Modi but also under the previous prime minister, Singh. He attempted 
to reform and clarify procurement procedures and started several policies to improve 
the domestic industry through imports.
120
 
Developing an indigenous arms industry is important for India, as it does not want to 
be pressured by foreign suppliers. Nonetheless, so far the industry has not been very 
successful. Procurement from abroad is therefore also guided by the desire to 
strengthen the domestic industry, as explained in further detail below. 
6.2.1 Choosing suppliers to benefit the domestic industry 
Technology transfer plays a major role in each tender for arms that India cannot 
develop indigenously. It is done to improve the domestic industry, and comes into play 
in multiple ways. As a starter, India wants foreign partners to offer generous offset 
deals. Offset is a mechanism where the recipient of a deal requires a supplier to engage 
in the economy in other ways besides the delivery of the product. This can be in the 
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form of making purchases from the industry of the recipient, licensed production, or 
investing in the recipient country. The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft 
(MMRCA) tender is the most expensive tender in Indian history; it is estimated to be 
worth between 11 billion USD and 20 billion USD. It is a great example of how 
important offset is for India. In 2012, after multiple rounds, India decided to negotiate 
exclusively with French Dassault, officially because of its lower life-cycle cost. An 
offset deal worth 50 percent was required by law. The USA offered two different jets, 
but did not even make it to the second round. Vucetic and Duarte attribute this to the 
fact that the USA restricts transfer of technology through offsets more than France or 
the European joint-venture Eurotyphoon does, which was the other company to be 
shortlisted.
121
 Now while the specifics are being hammered out, it turns out that France 
is hesitant to supply all the required technology. India demanded 108 planes to be 
manufactured in India, but according to Dassault that would increase costs 2.7 
times.
122
 Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) supposedly cannot absorb the 
technology, or produce the desired quality, or stick to the desired deadlines.
123
 Due to 
the increased costs, and the hesitation about technology transfer, the deal is currently 
reduced to only 36 ready-made planes. Even that deal is uncertain, despite India‘s 
alarming lack of combat aircraft. Still, Indian commentators critique Modi for not 
insisting enough on technology transfer. 
What one can take away from this incident is that whom India picks and the size of the 
contract depends partly on how much technology India can get from the offsets, to 
improve the industry. Offsets have become a more important strategy to receive 
technology. Offset became mandatory in 2005, and since 2012 all arms contracts with 
more than 50 percent foreign components require 30 percent offset in the form of 
counter purchases or FDI. In 2014, the cap of FDI was increased from 26 percent to 49 
percent to make offset more attractive. In cases of technology transfer 75 percent FDI 
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is allowed, and 100 percent when it involves new technology.
124
 It was increased 
because limits in FDI were seen as hampering defense trade with the USA 
especially.
125
 The success of the offset strategy has been limited, as many foreign 
vendors consider the Indian offset policy harsh and outdated, or feel that the Indian 
industry is not advanced enough to invest in.
126
 The lack of success does not take away 
from the fact that it is a strategy of the government to develop the industry, so it still 
influences their supplier choices. During the Cold War, offset deals with the Soviet 
Union included substantial licensing, countertrade, and cheap long-term financing. 
India could trade in rupees, which was preferable. Offset from Western countries was 
not as good, as they only offered limited licensing and some credit arrangements.
127
 
However nowadays, Russia does not offer better offseat deals anymore than others.  
India wants to improve the private sector, as it hopes it will be more efficient than the 
DSPUs. This might pressure the DSPUs into reforming and becoming more cost-
effective and market oriented, while listening more to the military‘s demands.128 
Foreign companies can partner with Indian companies through offset deals and 
strengthen the private sector.
129
 The role of the private sector in Russia is small, so 
Russia is not an ideal partner for this approach. Moscow allows arms exports only 
through Rosoboronexport,
130
 and there is a strong mindset among Russian defense 
firms that anything in the defense sector has to be done through the government.
131
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Overall, Russian investment in the Indian private sector is very low. Between 2000 
and 2015, Moscow was the 19th largest investor, with 0.42 percent of all FDI.
132
 There 
is little FDI yet in the defense sector, but Russia cannot really improve the situation.
133
 
India is also looking for foreign partners interested in setting up joint ventures . This 
can be done in or outside of an offset deal. The number of joint ventures has increased 
since 1998 and India also considers this a good model for technology transfer.
134
 
Russia and Israel offer the most advantageous joint ventures to India.
135
 Russia and 
India are jointly developing BrahMos cruise missiles, and India hails this cooperation 
as a model to repeat in the future. The equality of this partnership has been critiqued, 
as India‘s concrete contribution, besides financial, is hard to identify.136 BrahMos 
imports the propulsion system from Russia, and India is allegedly involved only in the 
assembly work of subsystems.
137
 Other joint ventures are the Indo-Russian PMF,
138
 
and the Israeli-Indo joint development of a longer-range version of the existing Israeli 
Barak missile.
139
 France and Israel agreed to jointly develop the short-range surface-
to-air missile (SAM) Maitri in 2007, but no concrete steps have been taken yet.
140
  
Overall, technology transfer is important for India, as the country wants to indigenize 
the defense production. While a desire for indigenization is not new, the strategies to 
receive technology through offset and FDI more recent. This focus has led to the rise 
of Israel especially, and decreased Russia‘s importance. The new importers offer more 
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attractive offset deals, with Western companies possessing substantial technology and 
wealth. Soviet offset used to be more advantageous for India than Western offset,  but 
it does do not stand out anymore. On the other hand, Russia does provide a lot of 
technology through joint ventures. Levine et al stated that increased competition leads 
to higher-level transfers of technology, and Russia seems to do precisely that to 
survive on the tougher Indian market. India‘s export market is so important for Russia 
that it supplies more and better technology than to any other recipient.
141
 Israel is an 
especially attractive trade partner, as it is supplying technology generously. Israel has 
stated that the deals between India and Israel Aerospace Industries were facilitated by 
the willingness to transfer technology and knowledge.
142
 No other countries are willing 
to transfer technology on this scale. The USA is more hesitant to supply higher levels 
of technology, and what it supplies is tamper-proof, making maintenance difficult. The 
USA does this to all recipients, but this is not to the liking of India.
143
 The USA has 
rejected all six joint high-technology projects that India proposed s ince signing the 
U.S.-India Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, which was supposed to facilitate 
technology transfer.
144
 When India was buying anti-tank missiles in 2014, it chose 
Israeli Spike missiles over US Javelin missiles specifically because Spike missiles 
came with more technology transfer and more extensive licensing.
145
  
6.2.2 The rise and fall of suppliers 
The above proves that, as Krause identified, India is motivated by the extent it will 
receive military technology to climb on the ladder of production. Bitzinger identified 
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India as a second-tier producer in 2004.
146
 There are good reasons for that. India 
currently produces a wide array of products, but imports critical components and lacks 
innovation. India also has ambitions to export to countries in South-East Asia, as it 
wants to make money and strengthen ties with friendly countries under the Look East 
Policy.
147
 These are typical qualities of a second-tier producer. Second-tier producers 
have different goals when it comes to importing, about what to import, as they desire 
type II or type III technology. New Delhi is looking not only for blueprints (type II) 
but especially for capacity transfer (type III), through investing, licensing and 
coproduction, so the Indian industry can flourish.  
Harkavy identifies Russia and the USA as first-tier producers, while Bitzinger 
identifies the USA, UK, France, Germany, and Italy as first-tier producers. Tier I 
suppliers are innovators, and Russia could arguably be downgraded to the second tier, 
as military R&D has gone down.
148
 As India rose from the third to the second tier, 
Russia fell from the first to the second tier. India thus prefers to buy from the current 
first-tier producers instead. This would make the USA, Italy and France more 
attractive suppliers. Brauer thinks that classifying countries in tiers is not relevant 
anymore, because arms production has become transnationalized. India attempts to 
become part of this transnational production through licensing. But the system 
designers it buys from, whether countries or companies, are located in the countries 
that Bitzinger classifies as first-tier producers, so the explanation holds up.  
There is specific weaponry that India wants which Russia cannot produce. Pant wrote 
that India desires smart weaponry (guided munitions), but production is still at a 
beginner level.
149
 The USA makes for a better supplier, as it has a strong technological 
edge on Russia.
150
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become more advanced, 
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and India wants to possess them too, as they are great for surveillance at its long 
borders.
151
 Russia is not an expert in drone production, while Israel and the USA 
are.
152
 Israel also offers electronic warfare technology that Russia cannot.
153
 Suman 
states that India only purchases arms from the USA that no other country possesses or 
wants to offer. The US technological prowess however ensures this is often the case.
154
 
Economic growth has also enabled India to afford the latest technology from Western 
suppliers. Russia has started an extensive campaign to modernize the industry, which 
might lead to a more competitive position in the future again.
155
 
6.2.3 Concluding remarks on the domestic industry 
A strong arms industry is a symbol of a strong and independent country. India aspires 
to be just that, which makes it a point of pride. New Delhi believes a strong arms 
industry is good for the economy, improves India‘s position in South-East Asia, and 
decreases dependence on major powers. However, the current arms production is 
lacking, so improving this is a priority. The strategy is to acquire technology through 
offset deals, investments in the private industry, and joint ventures. This has 
strengthened the position of certain suppliers over others. Russia used to offer more 
favorable offset deals during the Cold War, but its  current offset is not much further 
ahead. Moscow does offer a lot of technology through joint ventures though. Israel is  
very willing to transfer technology, which appeals to India. India‘s industry improved 
since the Cold War while Russia‘s deteriorated, so now India is looking at strong 
innovators, like the USA, France and Italy. Finally, new types of technology have 
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appeared, which Russia does not master as well, so India is looking for suppliers who 
do. Israel and the USA shine in that regard. 
6.3 Typologies of suppliers 
SIPRI‘s typology of suppliers divides suppliers into three categories: hegemonic, 
industrial, and restrictive. It identified Russia and the USA in 1975 as hegemonic; UK, 
France, and Italy as industrial; and Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, and Japan 
as restrictive. My hypothesis is that India has managed to reduce dependency on 
Russia and is now better able to acquire arms under its own terms. 
India has been trying to reduce dependency by developing the domestic industry and 
diversifying its suppliers. Table 6.1 shows three different measures to calculate 
diversification. Kinsella counts the amount of ties per country and calls this 
centralization. I measured this by calculating the amount of unique suppliers  per 
historical arms trade period as defined in Chapter Error! Reference source not 
found., lustrum, and the average of the annual number of suppliers. Harkavy also 
discusses the relative importance of suppliers , but he looks at their market share. For 
clarity‘s sake, I will refer to that here as consolidation, so all operationalizations of 
similar concepts have a different name. Over the three historical arms transfers 
periods, centralization increased slightly, as India traded with more countries each year 
on average. There were fewer unique suppliers in the intermediary period because the 
period was so short. Consolidation decreased, as the market shares of the five greatest 
suppliers went down. Split up by subsystem, one can see a marked increase in Table 
6.2 in the centralization of suppliers for aircraft and engines, and to a lesser extent for 
missiles and ships too. Not only does India have more suppliers, they are also offering 
arms in multiple weapon systems. 
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Table 6.1 Diversification of India’s arms suppliers 1970-2014 
 1970-1991 1992-1997 1998-2014 
Average of annual number of suppliers 7 8.3 9.87 
Number of unique suppliers per period 17 13 19 
Single largest supplier 72.6% 64.3% 72.1% 
Two largest suppliers 87.1% 74.5% 78.9% 
Three largest suppliers 91.3% 82.2% 85.4% 
Four largest suppliers 94.4% 88.5% 89.1% 
Five largest suppliers 96.0% 92.9% 91.5% 
Source: SIPRI Arms Trade Database 
Table 6.2 Number of unique suppliers in total and per weapon system for India 1970-2014 
  Total 
suppliers 
 
 
AD systems Aircraft Armored 
 vehicles 
Artillery Engines Missiles Naval  
weapons 
Sensors Ships Other  Cumulative suppliers 
 per subsystem 
‘70-‘74 8  0 4 0 1 2 5 0 1 1 0  14 
‘75-‘79 9  0 3 0 1 1 6 1 5 1 1  19 
‘80-‘84 9  1 4 2 2 0 4 4 3 4 0  24 
‘85-‘89 14  0 8 1 0 1 5 1 4 2 0  22 
‘90-‘94 10  4 0 4 1 0 6 2 0 3 0  20 
‘95-‘99 15  0 4 4 1 2 5 0 6 3 0  25 
‘00-‘04 16  3 8 2 1 1 4 3 3 6 0  31 
‘05-‘09 12  4 5 5 4 5 7 0 2 2 1  35 
‘10-‘14 15  1 11 1 1 6 7 0 5 3 0  35 
Total 24  13 47 19 12 18 49 11 29 25 2  225 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Register 
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India is also trying to change the nature of its relations with its suppliers. It is more 
appealing to purchase from an industrial supplier than a hegemon or a restrictive 
supplier, since an industrial supplier has the least leverage. Since India is now the 
largest defense importer in the world, it wants to dictate terms to its suppliers and have 
industrial relations with them.
156
 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had hegemonic relations with India, as it 
supplied arms under favorable economic conditions out of a strategic interest.
 
These 
conditions were generally offered to socialist states only.
157
 In 1971 the USA had 
hegemonic relations with many countries bordering the Soviet Union, in order to  
penetrate Asia strategically and surround the Soviet Union. Moscow made a pre-
emptive move to prevent the USA from doing that with India, and to counter the 
improving Sino-USA relations.
158
 There was no extensive pressure on India to do 
Russia favors, as interests aligned, and pre-emptive supply offers less leverage. The 
Soviet Union never had a monopoly, since its average annual share was 72 percent 
between 1970 and 1991.
159
 The hegemonic position of the Soviet Union changed after 
the Cold War. Presently, there is no trade under favorable conditions or with military 
aid. Russia pressured India when it sold the Gorshkov and controls the joint ventures, 
but not to the extent of full-fledged hegemony. The arms contracts are also not linked 
to political preconditions.
160
 Industrial arguments have also become more important 
for Russia, as it depends more on exports to keep up its industry. 
India also wants to avoid hegemonic relations with the USA. Industrial arguments are 
important to the USA,
161
 and the USA has not leveraged India (yet) into achieving US 
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goals in Asia.
162
 Nonetheless, India is afraid of the USA becoming a hegemonic 
supplier, and that is limiting further growth. One of the reasons Israel is an attractive 
supplier to India is that Israel asks no questions  and makes no demands.
163
 
Decreasing leverage might have also fuelled a desire to avoid restrictive suppliers, 
which harms arms trade with the Netherlands and Germany especially. Their small 
share is odd, as they were, respectively, the second and third largest suppliers in the 
intermediary period. Between 2009 and 2014, Germany was the fourth and the 
Netherlands the twelfth largest arms exporters worldwide.
164
 Outside arms trade, they 
are still major trade partners.
165
 That they disappeared from the market might be 
caused by their export policies. After Pokhran-II, the Netherlands maintained an arms 
embargo to India until 2004, the longest of all countries.
166
 The other countries with an 
arms embargo were Sweden and the USA.
167
 Dutch trade picked up in 1988, and its 
share reached a peak of 17 percent in 1993. It halted in 1998 and never recovered. 
While the Netherlands is not generally restrictive, and did not return to this restrictive 
policy after 2004, it is likely that India wants to avoid a similar situation in the future. 
Pokhran-II also influenced trade with the UK, as it stopped supplying parts after 
Pokhran-II. This caused great hesitation to buy UK Hawk-100 trainer jets, and India 
insisted on a guarantee that the UK would never stop supplying parts for those jets.
168
 
German export laws are also generally considered restrictive. It has for instance denied 
export licenses of SALW to some Indian police forces on the grounds that they were 
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committing human rights abuses in the fight against Naxalites.
169
 Another issue is that 
it supplies critical components to India‘s Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH). India has 
invested significantly in the ALH, and hopes to export it when it has been completed, 
but currently 90 percent of components are still foreign.
170
 Amnesty International 
accused India in 2007 of wanting to export the ALH to Myanmar, which is under 
embargo by the EU.
171
 Germany forbids re-export of components to embargoed 
destinations and wanted to enforce that. India denied wanting to export the ALH to the 
dictatorship,
172
 but as India had previously re-exported two British BN-2 Islander 
maritime-surveillance aircraft to Myanmar, there was cause for concern.
173
  
The importance of the export policies was shown during the second round of the 
MMRCA deal. It pitted French Dassault against Eurotyphoon, for which Germany 
took the lead in the negotiations. France and Germany have very different export 
policies. France expressed understanding after Pokhran-II, which Mohan attributes to 
France foreseeing India‘s potential as an export market.174 Only by exporting can 
France stay an independent arms producer, as otherwise R&D costs are too high. 
France has thus proved itself to be industrial, while Germany has proved itself to be 
restrictive, making France a better pick for the MMRCA.
175
  
The USA has also shown restrictive tendencies, as it only dropped the 1998 arms 
embargo in 2001, to get India‘s support in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks  
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on September 11, 2001.
176
 US export controls are strict. To avoid diversion, all 
recipients have to sign intrusive agreements so the US can keep control over its arms. 
India and the USA got into a diplomatic quarrel over signing the End-Use Monitoring 
Agreement, which gives the USA access to the arms during inspections, and sets 
conditions for the recipients to use the arms. Modification and re-export without 
permission are forbidden.
177
 Other agreements to receive technology that also 
increases interoperability have not been signed, as India does not want to be pressured 
into fighting US wars.
178
 India bought the P8I and C-130J aircraft without the 
accompanying electronics and avionics suites, as they required those agreements.
179
 
India believes it is a buyer‘s market, while the USA believes it is a seller‘s market, 
leading to different expectations. The export controls restrict the sale of high-tech 
sensitive technology, and not signing the agreements are a big hurdle for defense trade. 
They are seen as intruding on sovereignty, and as leading to patron-client relations.
180
 
Other countries are not so strict in their post-export controls. France for instance 
allowed India to modify Mirage-2000 jet fighters in the 1999 Kargil war.
181
 
Japan has traditionally had a very restrictive export policy fitting its post-WW2 
pacifist nature.
182
 Since 1976 it had a ban on all arms exports with a few small 
exceptions, but this ban was lifted in April 2014.
 
The problem with the old restrictive 
policy was that local defense production was extremely costly, because the industry 
was not able to sell to more clients than the Japanese government. The industry was 
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also cut off from joint ventures, which are often used for complex weapon systems.
183
 
Since the policy changed only last year, no major defense contracts have been signed 
yet between India and Japan, but there are rumors that Japan is interested in selling 
India six stealth submarines.
184
 India will also likely purchase twelve ShinMaywa US-
2i amphibious search-and-rescue aircraft in 2016.
185
 Japan‘s pivot from restrictive to 
industrial might lead to Japan becoming an important defense exporter to India too. 
Altogether, India is reducing dependence on hegemonic suppliers. In its position as the 
largest arms importer of the world, it sees the defense market as a buyer‘s market, 
where India can dictate the terms. With more suppliers, India can reduce their 
leverage. Russia changed from a mainly hegemonic to a mainly industrial supplier, 
which suits India. More suppliers and more competition prohibits hegemony. 
However, fear of US hegemony hinders more extensive trade with the USA. In the 
buyer‘s market, India does not want to deal with restrictive suppliers, and that has 
limited trade with the USA, and most likely Germany and the Netherlands too. The 
more India will want to export, the less dependence it will accept. France and Israel 
are great suppliers for India, as they are very industrial, and Japan might supply arms  
in the future as a new industrial supplier. By diversifying and choosing suppliers with 
specific types, India increases the control over its arms. 
6.4 Arms trade networks 
During the Cold War, India was formally part of the NAM. In practice, it also had 
close ties with the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the arms trade. India was determined 
to stay outside the bipolar system of the Cold War, but the USA-Pakistan alliance, 
animosity toward China, and the Sino-Soviet split all made the Soviet Union an 
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interesting partner.
186
 The West was not interested in providing weapons on favorable 
terms, especially after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, while the Soviet Union was. The 
1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was not a formal alliance, but 
it led to arms supplied for ―friendship prices,‖ consulting each other during crises, and 
not supporting third parties against each other. Kinsella mentions that arms trade 
reveals strategic interests sometimes better than formal alliances do, and that was the 
case here too. Through strategic relations, countries improve the trust in each other,  
now and in the future, and overcome the prisoner‘s dilemma of selling arms. In turn, 
arms trade strengthens strategic relations. In this chapter I will explain the strategic 
relations between India and its suppliers, and how that influences arms trade. 
6.4.1 The great powers 
The current geopolitical situation is different from what it was during the Cold War. In 
1993, India and Russia signed a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, without 
friendship prices, or the clauses about the US and Chinese threats. The first years after 
the Soviet collapse, Russia neglected its relations with India, but this turned around in 
1998, and now their relations are very good.
187
 Modi stated in December 2014 that 
Russia remains India‘s most important defense partner.188 They share concerns about 
the rise of China and Islamist terrorism, especially with the NATO departure from 
Afghanistan.
189
 They are both in favor of a multipolar world without US dominance 
and they support each other in the diplomatic world. Moscow called Pokhran-II 
justified and has hinted at accepting India as a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council.
190
 India refused to condemn the Kremlin for invading 
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Crimea.
191
 They are friendly toward each other, and India is probably the best friend 
Russia has, but their strategic link is not as strong as it used to be.
192
 Bilateral trade 
outside of arms is low, but both countries are working on improving this . Not everyone 
in India is also convinced Russia is strong enough to provide sufficient counterweight 
to US hegemony.
193
As Russia feels more threatened by the West, it might attempt to 
move closer to India for support, but it might also move closer to China. It is not that 
India has abandoned Russia, but that their relations have become more equal.  
The relations between the USA and India are complicated. The USA has become more 
interested in Asia, as the USA believes that Asia will play an important economic and 
political role in the 21st century.
194
. Specific US concerns about Asia are safeguarding 
the transport of energy on international shipping lanes in the IOR, China‘s rise, and the 
prevalence of radical Islam.
195
 India can profit from US engagement by receiving 
defense technology, improving bilateral trade and economic development, and gaining 
an ally against China.
 
The rise of neoliberalism in India has improved relations, as 
India‘s planned economy was a barrier to US-India cooperation.196 After the Indo-US 
Nuclear Pact in 2005, many scholars and policy advisors  predicted a close strategic 
partnership. Kaplan stated that the more India and China rise, the more welcome the 
USA will be as a counterbalance.
197 
There are still several roadblocks. India complains  
the US went back on promises on export control regimes and does not sell high-tech 
military technology. Trade in nuclear energy is also not coming from the ground.
198
 
The USA wishes India would support the USA more with Iran
199
 and not follow the 
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Russian and Chinese lead on Syria and Libya.
200
 The USA also bid on the MMRCA 
tender with two planes and losing the bid was a significant symbolic blow.
201
  
There are many explanations for the slow progress. Goals do not always align, as the 
USA wants a strategic alliance, while India prioritizes technology and development. 
New Delhi does not know if Washington will have India‘s back in the long term, and it 
fears US hegemony. The USA has previously reached out to and developed economic 
ties with China,
 
still pays considerable attention to the Middle East and Pakistan, and 
is struggling to find the resources for its foreign and military commitments , risking 
imperial overstretch. India might be hindered by overreliance on the USA in a conflict 
with Pakistan, as the USA still supplies military aid to Pakistan. India is cautious and 
does not want to antagonize China either.
202
 Their worldviews are different, and the 
USA does not seem to fully grasp India‘s perspective or its post-colonial identity, 
which is neutral, civilized, and with a moral view of the world order.
203 The anti-
Western ideology has also not completely disappeared yet. Slow bureaucratic 
policymaking in India, which resists change and big decisions, is not helping either.
204
 
However, the past year relations have gone upward again under Modi, who invited US 
president Obama as a guest of honor to Republic Day, ―India‘s most important formal 
invitation to offer.‖205 Modi‘s party, Bharatiya Janata Party, is on average more pro-
USA than its rival, Indian National Congress, which was in power previously. Modi 
feels that as both China and India rise, India can no longer afford ideological anti-
Western sentiments for economic and political reasons.
206
 Mukherjee and Thyagraj 
also say that the problems with the MMRCA deal and the lack of high-tech transfers 
are just small setbacks in a trend toward convergence, based on mutual strategic 
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interests and social links created by the Indian diaspora.
207
 It is not clear what the long-
term effects will be on arms trade, because it takes years to agree on deals and deliver 
the arms. These developments mean that the USA is important for India, but that India 
wants a partnership, not a patron, to maintain strategic autonomy.
208
 
6.4.2 The semi-great, medium, and small powers 
Strategic relations affect not only trade with the great powers, but all other countries. 
India is growing closer to Japan and South Korea, but carefully, to not offend China. 
South Korea‘s relations with China are decent, but by networking with another middle 
power, South Korea can exert more influence.
209 
Seoul aims to become a major arms 
exporter, and India would be a welcome market, while India hopes to jointly develop 
technology.
210
 North Korea is also rumored to have traded in nuclear material with 
Pakistan, to the dismay of both. It makes sense to befriend your enemy‘s friend‘s 
enemy. India‘s defense ties with Japan are closer than with South Korea. Japan sees 
India as a strategic and economic counterweight against China, a way to reduce 
overdependence on the USA, and an ideological ally as they are both democracies.
211
 
India and Japan have stated they want to make the trade in defense equipment and 
technology a ―key pillar of bilateral defense relations.‖212 Trade will likely be centered 
on naval equipment, as both are concerned about China‘s maritime power.213 The USA 
wants to accelerate this cooperation. In turn, Japan‘s view of India is influenced by 
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India-USA relations.
214
 The USA requested that India let Japan join their naval 
exercises in the hope of creating an alliance against China. India agreed to the naval 
exercises but is hesitant to become part of a formal alliance.
215
  
France has strong interests in the IOR, as its overseas territories there have a million 
inhabitants and are strategically located. There are French military bases in Abu Dhabi 
and Djibouti, and Paris wants to secure shipping routes.
216
 France sees India as a 
counterweight against US and Chinese dominance in Asia,
217
 and France could serve 
the same function for India. Military ties with France are close, and their relations go 
back a long time. It has been argued that France got to the final stage of the MMRCA 
tender to spread the risk and avoid dependence. Russian planes make up a large part of 
the IAF, especially with the PMFs,
218
 and India does not want to become dependent on 
the USA either. France makes the perfect counterbalance between the two.
219
  
Relations with the UK are affected by London‘s relations with Pakistan. The UK has 
been criticized for ―coddling‖ Pakistan, especially after remarks that India should 
resolve the issue in Kashmir to let Pakistan focus on fighting terrorism.
220
 In 2008, the 
UK decided to supply arms to Pakistan, despite a Commonwealth arms embargo 
following the 2007 military coup.
221
 These frustrations, combined with the fact that the 
UK is not engaging substantially in South Asia, have led to a decline in arms trade. 
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Israel and India have gotten closer, largely as the result of arms trade instead of as a 
precursor.
222
 Israel would like a closer strategic relation to soften the perception of 
Israel in the NAM, cooperate in fighting Islamist terrorism, and push India away from 
Iran.
223
 This will likely not happen, as India has good relations with the Middle East, a 
significant Muslim population, and strong domestic opposition in the left.
224
  
Australia is following Japan‘s and US leads and has become more interested in 
strategic cooperation with India. This is limited by Australia‘s mixed feelings .225 
Canberra wants both India‘s and China‘s markets and desires stability in the IOR.226 In 
turn, Australia does not have that much to offer to India, but in 2014 Australia agreed 
to sell uranium to India. This big political decision might change things.
227
 
Finally, India‘s troubled relations with Pakistan are one of the motivations for its 
increasing presence in Central Asia. Up until the 2000s, New Delhi engaged with 
Central Asian countries mainly through Moscow, but now India has started to engage 
with them directly. New Delhi has tried to maximize the NATO presence in 
Afghanistan as a counter to Pakistan
228
 and wants to encircle Pakistan through Indian 
presence in Central Asia as well.
229
 Securing energy is also important, as there is 
plenty of fossil energy and uranium. For Central Asian countries, India can serve as a 
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balancing power between Russia, China, and the USA.
230
 There is some doubt about 
the geopolitical utility of these relations, as India has no direct access  to them.
231
 
However, relations are growing stronger and are a likely explanation for the increasing 
supplies from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In fact, 83 percent of all Kyrgyz arms 
exports and 99.6 percent of all Uzbek arms exports have gone to India, and Uzbekistan 
is the fourth greatest trading partner in volume in the current period since 1998.
232
 
The strategy of multi-alignment and balancing powers would suggest increasing 
engagement with other rising powers, like Brazil and South Africa. However, trade is 
likely thwarted by the fact that India cannot develop its industry with their technology. 
6.4.3 Corruption 
While the individual strategic relations have been discussed, corruption plays an 
important role in general. Trust is essential to create a stable network and corruption 
can undermine that, especially as it is a huge issue in India. Antony, the Minister of 
Defence under Singh, was for instance accused of evading and delaying procurement 
decisions just to avoid corruption scandals.
233
 In 1987, allegations of corruption in a 
purchase of Swedish Bofors Howitzers even brought down the Indian government. 
That scandal is still referred to regularly. Sweden‘s non-existent share on the market, 
despite its position as the 11th largest arms exporter worldwide, might be related to 
that. Russia used to be seen as less corrupt than the ―mercenary and unscrupulous‖ 
capitalist West.
234
 However, capitalism is not a dirty word anymore in India.
235
 Russia 
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was suspected of corruption during the Gorshkov deal
236
 and the Ordnance Factory 
Scam.
237
 Therefore, Russia does not have the advantage of being perceived as less 
corrupt anymore. It has been argued that the MMRCA tender did not go to the USA 
because corruption allegations in that deal would create so much backlash in India, 
that the reputation of the USA might not recover.
238
 India has a rigorous policy of 
blacklisting any company accused of corruption. In 2005 Denel, the state-owned South 
African defense conglomerate, was blacklisted based on mere allegations, which 
affected trade substantially. The ban was lifted in 2014, so trade might pick up 
again.
239
 It has also affected South Korea, as Kangnam Corp. was blacklisted in 2013 
for using a middleman, which is forbidden. This annoyed Seoul, who threatened to not 
do business again with India.
240
 The corruption policy thus hinders India‘s options for 
diversifying procurement. Over the past two years the corruption policy has been 
relaxed, as several bans have been lifted and agents are now allowed.
241
 Italian/UK 
Agusta-Westland also did not get blacklisted after a major scandal in 2014.
242
 This will 
smooth procurement procedures and increase the possible number of suppliers. India 
will thus have more options, fitting in a strategy of diversification. 
6.4.4 Implications of arms trade networks 
Strengthened strategic relations with many different countries are a natural result of 
India‘s growth on the recipient side, and an increased interest in Asia on the supplier 
side.These relations facilitate a balanced arms network. Closer relations foster the trust 
that is necessary to overcome the security dilemma and let technology and information 
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pass through. India does not want to join any formal alliance, as part of its policy of 
neutrality, but the trade is a good indicator of improved strategic relations. These 
strategic relations enable India to pursue a balance of power politics in its arms deals 
without choosing sides, thus ensuring a steady supply of arms. This reduces the 
leverage countries have against India and facilitates India‘s strategic autonomy.243 
Mohan mentions the omni-directional engagement with all great powers, and that 
strategy is also reflected in arms trade.
244
  
India‘s strategic relations used to be defined by non-alignment. In theory, that meant 
India would not define its (inter)national interests through foreign goals or ideologies, 
and that it would retain maximum strategic autonomy to develop itself, for a more just 
and equal world order.
245
 Many critics look down on this approach and say that in 
practice it meant weakness and inaction.
246
Others feel that the end of bipolarity made 
non-alignment trivial.
247
 Both the left-wing United Progressive Alliance and the right-
wing National Democratic Alliance have called it irrelevant and dead,
248
 and the US 
establishment has called it an outdated concept.
249
  
However, in 2012, a group of experts published a book called Non-Alignment 2.0, 
recommending a modern version of non-alignment. They state that ensuring India‘s 
internal development is key. To achieve this , India needs to ―enhance [its] strategic 
space and capacity for independent agency,‖ to give it the most options for relations 
with the outside world, which in turn gives it the most options for internal 
development. Non-Alignment 2.0 is different, as the global system is different and 
more intertwined. To maintain economic growth, India engages more with the outside 
                                                 
243
 Dipankee Banerjee, ―India‘s defence and security in the 21st century: Hard choices,‖ Center for Land 
Warfare Studies (2014): 2, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1028663823_DipankarBanerjee.pdf. 
244
 Mohan, ―India and the balance of power,‖ 23. 
245
 Sunil Khilnani et al, Nonalignment 2.0: A foreign and strategic policy for India in the Twenty First Century 
(New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012), 8, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/working_papers/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf. 
246
 Bronson, ―Tempered rivalries,‖ 8. 
247
 Tellis, ―Unity in difference,‖ 17. 
248
 Seema Mustafa, ―Non-alignment 2.0 need of the hour,‖ DNA India, March 2, 2012, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-non-alignment-20-need-of-the-hour-1657268. 
249
 Zorawar Singh, ―Flashback: Non-alignment 2.0,‖ Pragati, March 2, 2012, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2012/03/flashback-non-alignment-2-0/. 
59 
 
world on all levels: trade, labor, technology, and ideas. Anti-West sentiments have 
diminished. Old non-alignment was about passively staying out of the world order to 
avoid being caught between two frontlines, but Non-Alignment 2.0 is about taking an 
active role, carefully balancing different powers. India should engage not with no one 
but with everyone, thereby reducing their influence. It should take the side that best 
serves its interests on a case-by-case basis without  rejecting other options.
250  
The work has been criticized extensively, including by the past three National Security 
Advisors, who feel that India should align with the USA.
251
 Pant calls it insufficient to 
deal with China and does not see Non-Alignment 2.0 reflected in Indian policy, 
considering Modi‘s positive stance toward the USA and more assertive stance toward 
China.
252
 Non-Alignment 2.0 is called outdated, but a lot of the criticism is partly 
based on prejudice about non-alignment 1.0.
253
 Commentators said it conceded too 
much to China and concluded that it was against engaging too much with the USA.
254
 
But, actually, it recommends that India encourages US maritime power in the Asia-
Pacific yet be careful, as the USA can be demanding and resentful of other ties. It 
should just avoid relations beyond a certain threat threshold to China.
255
  
Maximizing the number of arms suppliers and creating a coalitional multi-polar arms  
network while minimizing the leverage on India, to create national power and a strong 
military technological base, is just what Non-Alignment 2.0 recommends. I do not 
make any claims about a wider (grand) strategy than one for supplier choices, nor do I 
think this is an active policy in New Delhi, considering the backlash, the lack of 
concrete policy recommendations, and the behavior toward China and the USA. I am 
merely saying that the idea of strategic autonomy through multi-alignment, as Non-
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Alignment 2.0 recommends, is in practice one of the pillars of choosing arms 
suppliers.  
6.5 A new world? 
Harkavy draws our attention to how the international system affects arms supplies. In 
1994 he suggested the world was returning to the Interbellum model of arms trade. Yet 
many of the characteristics of arms trade in the Interbellum are not currently found. 
The market share of countries was not and is still not related to GDP.256 There is not 
less co-production and co-development, as those have actually increased, and there is  
not less licensing.257 India did not lose its dominant supplier (more than 60 percent in 
share) in volume over the period since 1998, nor the last lustrum. There has not been a 
dominant supplier in financial value between 2011 and 2013 though.
258
 Some 
characteristics are hard to measure, like the amount of export controls or re-transfers. 
To state that the world is like the Interbellum again is therefore inaccurate. However, a 
few changes Harkavy predicted have occurred.  
6.5.1 Polarity 
The extent to which the world has changed should first be analyzed, which is not easy. 
Harkavy decided on bipolarity because there were two major nuclear superpowers 
with first-strike capabilities. That is not a good way to define polarity. There were no 
nuclear weapons in the Interbellum, so the operationalization lacks historical 
continuity. The nuclear balance now involves smaller, regional nuclear powers with 
different nuclear rulebooks, which alters the implications of first strike capabilities.
259
 
There is extensive debate on whether the world is currently unipolar or multipolar, and 
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I cannot reflect all opinions here. Mearsheimer thinks that while the USA is currently 
stronger than all other states it is not a global hegemon. He identifies the USA, Russia, 
China, and potentially Japan and India as great powers and calls the world an 
unbalanced multipolar system.
260
 Waltz stated in 2000 that we are in a transitional 
period between unipolarity and multipolarity, with the new great powers located in 
Asia.
261
 With the developments of the past fifteen years, calling the world multipolar is 
reasonable. Harkavy himself wrote in a 2005 article that the world was unipolar mixed 
with asymmetric multipolarity.
262
 In his 1975 book he described the 18th and 19th 
centuries as multipolar despite strong disparities in powers among all the important 
actors.
263
 For this reason, he also included a gradient of power. Following Harkavy‘s 
logic that classified the world as multipolar even during strong asymmetry, we can say 
that the current world is asymmetric multipolar, even though that is disputed. 
A multipolar world is in India‘s interest, as it has always felt threatened  by its position 
between two bipolar blocs. The multipolar world allows for India‘s strategy of Non-
Alignment 2.0. Multipolarity facilitates arms trade for industrial motivations instead of 
hegemonic ones. Suppliers want to sell weapons to whomever they can in order to 
make money. Recipients are not bound anymore to buy from a specific bloc but can 
buy from whomever they want. This would lead to more cross -bloc trade. India is not 
a member of any blocs, so instead I measure whether it is purchasing from multiple 
blocs, as identified by Harkavy. I use WMEAT for the historical comparison of the 
financial value. Unfortunately this does not offer data on all time periods or on a 
country level, so comparison is suboptimal. Table 6.3 shows that the financial value of 
the arms trade is divided more evenly over different blocs nowadays. The volume of 
the arms trade has not changed as much. 
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Table 6.3 Extent of multiple bloc trade in volume and financial value 1975-1979 vs. 2010-2014 
TIV Financial value 
1975-1979 2010-2014 1975-1979 2009-2011 
Warsaw Pact 73.3% Russia* 69.8% Warsaw Pact 85.9% Russia 42.9% 
NATO 19.8% USA* 12.0% NATO 14.1% USA 29.4% 
Switzerland 6.9% EU* 7.0%   EU 11.8% 
  Other 10.9%   Other 15.9% 
*If measuring the spheres of influence instead of formal alliances, and assuming that Uzbekistan is in the 
Russian sphere of influence, Australia, Israel, Canada and Israel are in the US sphere of influence, Switzerland is 
in the EU sphere of influence, and South Africa and Ukraine (since 2014) are unaligned, the shares in volume are  
as follows: Russia – 71.8%; USA – 19.6%, EU: 7.3%, Other: 1.37%. 
Sources: Adaptation of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and WMEAT. 
Another effect of multipolarity is the amount of suppliers. In a multipolar world, arms 
trade will be less consolidated, and the great powers will have smaller market shares. 
As arms production is prestigious, more powers will develop independent arms 
production and compete on the market. Table 6.1 showed how the market shares of the 
top five suppliers were indeed decreasing, although not significantly. Multipolarity 
also suggests multiple-supplier relations. As seen in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, India has 
an increasing number of suppliers, especially when separated by weapon system. 
Lastly, a multipolar world causes insecurity about whether a country will be able to 
obtain arms in the future. As economic motives prevail over strategic ones, recipients 
can no longer count on a steady supply of weapons. To counter that, countries focus 
instead on developing their own industry. On Harkavy‘s six-level scale of 
independence, India has moved up from level 3, Mixed Independence-Dependence (as 
independence in production, but dependence for R&D) to level 4, Mixed Dependence-
Independence (significant licensing capacity, limited independent R&D and 
dependence on imports or licensing). India‘s indigenization efforts showcase the 
stronger insistence on independence.  
6.5.1 Technological change 
Harkavy also states that the rate of technological change in weaponry affects how arms 
are traded throughout the world. Harkavy measured technological change as the 
number of generations of fighter aircraft and main battle tanks. That does not seem to 
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be a strong operationalization right now.
264
 The past decades have seen an influx of 
new technology, such as stealth, robotics, sensors, and electronics, and a rise in 
irregular warfare, for which fighter aircraft and main battle tanks are less essential. 
Innovation has been rapid.
265
 The focus on quality over quantity is supported by the 
fact that the worldwide volume of arms has decreased.
266
 A fast rate of technological 
change also explains why second-tier producers are struggling on the market.  
Slow technological change occurs during quantitative arms races, while fast change 
occurs during qualitative arms races. Quantitative arms races are fuelled by imminent 
threats, while qualitative arms races are not subject to the same urgency. In my 
opinion, a qualitative arms race can also lead to fast technological change, because 
necessity is the mother of innovation. Dyadic rivalries are characterized by qualitative 
arms races, and India and Pakistan have such a rivalry. Ijyer-Mitra claims that India 
traditionally focused on quantity in the IAF, while Pakistan focused on quality.  Yet 
nowadays quality is of increasing importance to India.
267
 India insists on having better 
aircraft than Pakistan and when India attempted to purchase Howitzers, the range of 
the guns compared to the range of Pakistani Howitzers played a key role.
268
 
Furthermore, as China rises, India is not only starting to see a quantitative arms gap 
but also a qualitative gap.
269
 This creates a greater sense of urgency to get high-quality 
weapons, which are offered by first-tier suppliers, as they are innovators .  
A fast rate of technological change suggests that as suppliers develop new weapons, 
they are more willing to release the outdated versions to the market. The rise of new 
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technology might mean that more countries are willing to offer good conventional 
weapons, as they feel that new technology will give them the advantage in warfare 
now. Yet, even though the West might produce higher quality weapons, that does not 
mean they are all offered to India. A quick comparison in Table 6.4 of the aircraft 
offered for the MMRCA tender shows a marked difference in the ages. Not only did 
the USA offer the oldest weapons, it was also the only country with a new generation 
in development (Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II) that it did not offer. Harkavy 
states that France has always been willing to offer the latest weapons in order to steal 
markets from the USA and Russia. This still seems to be the case, and makes it an 
attractive seller. Now, as this is only one tender, no conclusions can be derived from it, 
but it is interesting. Further research would need to be carried out to make an 
exhaustive comparison. 
Table 6.4 Comparison of age of aircraft offered in MMRCA tender 
Origin Name Year of introduction  
USA Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 1999 
USA Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon 1978 
France Dassault Rafale, 2001 
Russia Mikoyan MiG-35 Under development 
Sweden Saab JAS 39 Gripen 1997 
Europe Eurofighter Typhoom 2003 
Source: Wikipedia. 
One of the takeaways of this is that there are many different definitions of quality. It 
can be related to the characteristics, age, level innovation, the rate of malfunctioning 
(as in Chapter  6.1), etc. Russia struggles with newer technologies, but its conventional 
weapon production is not as much behind.
270
 India is still interested in those weapons 
too, so Russia has not lost all of its appeal. India is also not only interested in the 
quality of arms, but also the quantity, and Russia remains a good trade partner for that. 
 
                                                 
270
 Jonas Gratz, ―Russia‘s military reform: Progress and hurdles,‖ Center for Security Studies 152 (2014): 3, 
accessed July 20, 2015, www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSSAnalyse152-EN.pdf. 
65 
 
6.5.1 Conclusion about the international systems 
Multipolarity enables India to purchase from many different suppliers with industrial 
motives. Not only does it buy from more suppliers, the suppliers also have smaller 
shares on the Indian arms market, and they come from different blocs, if arms trade is  
measured by the financial value. Multipolarity also made indigenization more 
essential, as industrial motives do not guarantee future sales. Fast technological change 
is related to qualitative arms races, which India is experiencing with Pakistan and 
China. This motivates India to buy high-quality arms from the West.  
6.6 Export control regimes 
Levine et al describe the effect of the combination of economic and strategic 
considerations. India‘s economic position has improved substantially since 1970.  
According to the World Bank, India‘s GDP has risen from 63.5 billion USD in 1970 to 
1876.8 billion USD in 2014, and it currently has the world‘s fourth largest GDP. This  
has put India in a better position to afford the higher prices of the West. Not only can 
India now afford Western prices, the price of Russian weapons has increased as well, 
due to the rate of imported components and growing domestic costs.
271
 This makes the 
price a worse reason to purchase from Russia. 
According to Levine et al, suppliers face a collective-action problem, which affects 
their export decisions. The arms embargo by the USA, Sweden, and the Netherlands 
following Pokhran-II is a good example. Other countries did not join in, which made 
the embargo useless. Export control regimes are a way to deal with the collective-
action problem, as countries jointly decide on what can be exported and what should 
be taken into account when deciding on an export license. It lowers the risk of 
destabilizing stockpiles that can occur if countries compete for a market. For example, 
the EU export control regime lets countries share rejected export-license applications, 
so suppliers are not played out against each other. There are four global export control 
regimes currently, which are the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology 
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Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group. India is not a 
member of any of them, but aspires to be. While most regimes do not require the 
recipient to be a member, membership is generally seen as  a sign of trustworthiness 
and responsibility. Membership would enable India to participate in managing 
strategic trade and the diffusion of advanced technology
272
 and showcase that India is 
an independent actor in the global arena.  
The NSG was set up in 1975 in response to India‘s PNE in 1974, as India used 
Canadian civil nuclear material to develop warheads. The NSG restricted India from 
buying material that could facilitate the development of nuclear weapons. This 
changed in 2005 when India and the USA signed the India-United States Civil Nuclear 
Agreement, in which India promised to separate civil and military nuclear reactors and 
put civil reactors under control of the IAEA. Following this, the NSG granted India a 
waiver in 2008 to purchase civilian nuclear technology. The collective decision to 
(dis)allow nuclear trade with India is a way to avoid the economic and strategic 
fallback from others supplying nuclear material to India.
273
 Russia, France, the USA, 
the UK, Canada, and South Korea have signed nuclear trade agreements following the 
waiver.
274
 The agreements show that those countries consider India a responsible 
nuclear state, which makes way for stronger strategic relations and increases the trust 
needed to sell weapons.
275
 However, it is a chicken/egg question. Nuclear agreements 
might also be signed in order to sell arms and nuclear material. No matter the order, 
signing these agreements helps with arms trade. As mentioned, the India-US 
Agreement was long seen as a turning point for strategic relations . It has now come 
under fire because many promises have not held up. The USA would support India‘s  
quest for membership of the export control regimes, but this has not extended beyond 
lip service, even though India has adapted its legal instruments to (mostly) fit in line 
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with the regimes.
276
 A 2010 law put the responsibility for nuclear accidents on 
suppliers, which deterred US investors.
277
 Following that, Washington did not want to 
do the diplomatic heavy lifting anymore on India‘s membership of these regimes.278 
This shows that diplomatic support follows economic interests, hinting that the nuclear 
agreements were signed in order to improve trade. 
The MTCR limits the trade in the missiles that can be used to deliver WMD. The 
MTCR divides missiles into two categories.
279
 Missiles in Category I (payload over 
500kg/range over 300km) are not to be traded, while miss iles in Category II (payload 
less than 500kg/range less than 300km) are supposed to be traded only with great 
restraint. The payload and range may be traded off against each other. When deciding 
whether to approve a license, a supplier should look at whether the target owns or is  
trying acquire WMD, the purposes and capabilities of the missile and space programs, 
the contribution the missile can make to the development of a delivery system for 
WMD, a country‘s credibility, the risk of diversion, and whether the trade conflicts 
with multilateral treaties. All major developers of missiles are members of this regime 
or say they adhere to its regulations (e.g., China and Israel).
280
 Since India is a nuclear 
state, exporting states should be cautious. The PJ-10 BrahMos missile, which was 
jointly developed by Russia and India, just skirted the borders of Category I with a 
range of 290 km, and Russia received international criticism for that. In 2002, India 
wanted to purchase Arrow 2 missiles from Israel. The USA had contributed to the 
development of the missiles and vetoed the sale, stating that it would breach the 
MTCR, as they had potential to reach a range of 300 km.
281
 The US contributions to 
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the development of the Arrow system already went against the MTCR, as Israel is a 
non-member and a nuclear state. This shows the decision is political rather than legal. 
India formerly applied for membership in June 2015, so this might lead to it buying 
Category I missiles in the future, most likely from Russia. Applicants only get 
accepted with a unanimous vote, but the USA has a lot of influence. It will be 
interesting to see how much active support the USA will provide and what the USA 
will demand for that in return. As of July 2015, the USA and Sweden have expressed 
support explicitly after the bid,
282
 while Russia, France, and the UK expressed 
hypothetical support earlier.
283
 While this is not explicitly said, the support is likely 
given to improve these countries‘ chances on the Indian defense market, as they are all 
major arms exporters. Membership of the NSG is the next step. 
The MTCR includes some types of UAVs, since in practice it is difficult to 
differentiate between missiles and UAVs. It excludes many drones that should 
arguably be included, especially new types of technology. The Israeli Harop 
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) has a range of 1,000 km and counts as an 
explosive itself, as it loiters on the battlefield to attack targets. The Heron, another 
Israeli UAV, has a range of 3,000 km, and can carry a warhead of 250 kg, while its 
successor, the Heron TP, can fly for 7,400 km and has a maximum payload of 1,000 
kg, enough for a nuclear weapon.
284
 India has purchased both the Harop and the 
original Heron. The USA has developed similar weapons. These UAVs are not 
currently included in the MTCR. Efforts to include them have been blocked by drone 
exporters, such as the USA, because of strong pressure from the companies producing 
them.
285
 US law does not allow the export of Category I UAVs to non-MTCR member 
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states, although it allows exports to Israel in practice.
286
 The USA has been trying to 
downgrade certain UAVs to Category II instead of I,  as it wants to increase exports 
with non-members in Asia, but it failed.
287 Membership in this regime would give 
India influence on deciding how these UAVs get regulated, and increase its global 
influence on arms trade. 
All in all, there are several collective solutions in place to deal with the risks countries 
face when exporting arms. Membership of export regimes would likely improve 
India‘s stature and influence in the world and might lead to more countries interested 
in supplying to India. However, the road to membership has not been easy, and the 
USA has not really supported India as it promised. The MTCR controls the worldwide 
trade in missiles and has been a tool to limit missile transfers from Israel before. Now 
India is seeking membership to have a seat at the table where missile trade is regulated 
and the support for India is likely influenced by a desire to sell to India. I predict that 
India will gain membership, but that only Russia and Israel might possibly supply 
Category I missiles, as they generally provide the most advanced weapons. 
6.7 Worldwide patterns 
Some changes in supplier choices come from developments on the supplier side. 
Bitzinger says that after the Cold War ended, second- and third-tier countries were not 
able to achieve autarky or cost-effective and financially beneficial weapon production. 
Second-tier suppliers struggle because of growing economic and technological 
demands. Countries use six different strategies to adjust to that partially or completely 
abandon defense production; focus on arms exports; convert from defense to 
commercial production; specialize in specific industries; leverage dual-use 
technologies; and produce transnationally.  
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It is a reasonable assumption that India buys from the countries that succeeded in 
adapting their industries successfully in some or all of these aspects. Bitzinger states  
that Israel has had the most successful adaptation, and it fits the neatest in the ladder 
model. It has shown great success in exporting arms, converting the defense industry 
to commercial production and carving out a niche for itself in UAVs, AAM, 
reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and electro-optics. Israel is also increasingly 
engaged in transnational production. Harkavy notes that South Africa is good at 
adapting equipment to unique environments.
288
 Mohanty writes that one of India‘s 
challenges is to find systems that can meet the harsh and diverse climate conditions in 
the region,
289
 and India mainly buys armored personnel carriers from South Africa, 
which hold up well on difficult terrain.
290
 South Africa‘s niche is thus useful. The 
successes of Israel and South Africa explain their role on the Indian arms market.  
Bitzinger‘s theory can be applied to other countries outside his book too. In the Cold 
War, the SALW market was dominated by the USA and the Soviet Union, but over the 
past two decades Switzerland has become an important SALW exporter too.
291
 India is  
one of its biggest clients.
292
 It is likely that Switzerland specialized in the production 
of SALW as a niche. The data does not show that, as SALW are not covered by the 
SIPRI Arms Trade Database. Another example is Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia used to 
have extensive armaments cooperation. Ukraine supplied Russia with components for 
missiles and with engines for helicopters and aircraft
293
 Of the fifteen entries of 
Ukrainian arms sales on the Arms Trade Register, ten are for components for Russian 
ships and aircraft. Purchasing from Russia thus led to Ukrainian sales. The war in 
Crimea will likely put a halt to Ukrainian sales, as India supports Russia in this matter, 
and coproduction of Ukraine and Russia has ceded. Some adaptation strategies can be 
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seen in first-tier suppliers too. In Europe, national defense spending declined 
significantly after the Cold War, so the local markets shrunk. Exporting became a 
necessity. During the financial crisis  of 2007–2009, defense budgets were slashed in 
many countries. The Italian industry, for instance, had to focus  on exports to survive, 
because it was hit so heavily.
294
 India, as the biggest arms importer in the world, is like 
a ripe peach for these industries struggling to survive. Changes in the defense industry 
in these countries thus lead to changes on the Indian arms import market. 
6.7.1 Worldwide trends or an unique Indian position? 
It is not always clear to what extent changes are caused by historical developments  or 
policy changes in India, or by policy changes of the supplier. I will test that, by 
comparing suppliers‘ annual share in India‘s total imports (in TIV) to their share in the 
imports of the second to fourth largest importers, as well as their worldwide share. 
SIPRI identifies the top five arms importers between 2010 and 2014 as India, China, 
Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. I use a Spearman 
correlation, as the data is non-parametric and monotonic, to test how closely a 
supplier‘s share is associated with that supplier‘s share to another top importer. A 
significant test means that when the share of that supplier changes in India, it changes 
the same way somewhere else. This suggests that a change is not unique to India. This 
is not the most elegant model to run a time series, but it was the best that could be 
done with the available software, data, and the large number of tests. For statistical 
reasons, India cannot be compared to another importer if a supplier does not sell any 
arms at all to that importer. The results can be found in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Comparison of the purchasing patterns of the top five arms importers 1970-2014 
 Pakistan China Saudi Arabia UAE Global   
Australia -0.10    0.22   
Canada 0.49** 0.23 0.05 0.37** -0.01   
Czechoslovakia     -0.35   
France -0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.19 -0.05   
Germany (FRG) -0.31** -0.46** 0.07 0.30** 0.45**   
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Ghana     0.68**   
Israel  -0.10   0.78**   
Italy 0.35** -0.28* 0.14 -0.23 0.40**   
Japan  -0.06   0.17   
Kazakhstan     0.67**   
Kyrgyzstan     0.91**   
Netherlands 0.46**  -0.16 0.48** 0.38**   
Poland     0.45**   
Russia 0.45** 0.02  -0.20 0.49**   
Singapore    0.35** 0.37**   
Slovakia -0.12    0.50**   
South Africa   0.08 0.16 0.31**   
South Korea     0.05   
Soviet Union -0.02 -0.14  0.07 -0.18   
Sweden 0.29*  -0.11 0.02 0.00   
Switzerland -0.17 -0.27 -0.29 0.17 0.17   
Ukraine -0.15 -0.35  0.26 0.03   
United Kingdom 0.03 -0.55** -0.08 0.29* 0.11   
United States 0.00 -0.06 -0.38** 0.37** 0.06   
Uzbekistan     0.93**   
        
Amount of suppliers 0.38** 0.73** 0.61** 0.55** 0.45**   
Significance: 0.01 ≤ P ≤ 0.05 = *, P≤0.01 = ** 
Source: Adaptation of SIPRI arms transfers database 
The most likely explanations for a significant relationship are that the supplier‘s 
industry has developed, its export policies changed, or that India makes up a large 
share of all exports. The latter is the case for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as India is  
the target destination for 83 percent and 99.6 percent respectively of all arms exports. 
It is true to a lesser extent for Ghana, Israel, and Russia, with 24 percent, 20 percent 
and 29 percent respectively of all exported arms going to India. For those three 
countries, domestic factors also play a role. The industry or export policies influence 
the  share of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Singapore. Maybe they 
climbed up or down the ladder of production or switched between hegemonic, 
industrial or restrictive motives. Maybe they adapted more or less successfully to their 
position as second-tier supplier. However to give a clear reason, one would need to 
study their respective industries.  
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My hypothesis was that as a country supplied more arms to Pakistan, it would supply 
less to India, and vice versa. However, that was only the case for Germany, who 
supplied to Pakistan almost exclusively between 1970 and 1981 and then switched to 
mostly supplying India instead. The hypothesis was suspected for Russia, but there 
was actually a positive correlation there. SIPRI‘s Arms Trade Register shows that 
Pakistan ordered RussianMi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H helicopters through the UK, Denmark, 
or China. This might be re-exports outside Russian control, but it is not 100-percent 
clear. The positive relation between Pakistan and India for buying Dutch arms can be 
explained by the fact that arms sales to both s topped after the nuclear tests. Periods of 
instability in South Asia might have led to increased procurement for both countries at 
similar times, explaining the other positive significant relations. Finally, India‘s trend 
toward diversification matches with the other importers and the rest of the world. The 
state of polarity of the world most likely caused this. 
In conclusion, India‘s experiences are somewhat explained by changing circumstances  
on the supplier side. Some industries developed better than others, or did not adapt in a 
way that fits India‘s needs. Niche specialization is especially a strong factor in the 
success of selling to India. Weak domestic economies create a stronger need to export 
globally. Overall, it shows that not all changes are caused by Indian developments. For 
a complete picture, one would need to study the industry and export policies of each 
country individually. 
6.8 Sensitivity comparison 
There is a lot of uncertainty about the extent of the decline of Russian-Indian relations. 
Russia is not the number-one supplier in raw dollars and might not be the greatest 
innovator, but what about the type of weapons India receives from Russia? Russia 
offers India weapons no other country does, like the nuclear submarine INS Chakra, 
which it would not lease to any other country either.
295
 This sparked the question about 
the sensitivity of delivered weapons on a structural level. How does the sensitivity of 
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the weapons differ by supplier? As with quality, sensitivity is also not clearly defined, 
but it refers to how critical a weapon is to the national security and how much it gives  
an advantage to the owner. Now, there is no standard for measuring the sensitivity, 
like how advanced a piece of equipment is , or comparing classes of arms with each 
other, as confirmed by experts from SIPRI, which was the original plan for this 
thesis.
296
 Countries likely classify their exports into different sensitivity levels, but that 
is not public. Arms have so many characteristics that there is no systematic way to 
judge sensitivity, just as with quality. Instead, to figure out how the sensitivity of arms 
from different suppliers compares, I shall present a case study on missiles.  
This is not deemed to be representative of all weapons, since countries often have 
niches for specific weapon types. As said earlier, Israel is a world leader in UAV 
production, so comparing UAVs from Israel to UAVs from France would suggest that 
Israel exports more sensitive arms, ignoring the fact that France might export more 
sensitive submarines. Instead, it is a case study meant to generate a hypothesis on the 
possible causal relation between the sensitivity of arms supplied to India and the 
choice for suppliers. To judge all weapons, one would need to develop a methodology 
to run a large N cross-case study of all weapon types over time, and that goes beyond 
the scope of this thesis and my technical knowledge of weapons.
297
 Missiles are 
chosen because they are relatively homogenous, and the differences between missiles 
are relatively limited. It is complex technology, but compared to other high-level 
weapon systems, there are fewer essential characteristics, and they are quantifiable.  
6.8.1 Methodology 
The data used consists of all the missile transfers in SIPRI Arms Transfers Register 
since 1998.
298
 Missiles are judged on their speed, range and payload (the weight of the 
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warhead). These characteristics are chosen because the MTCR categorizes missiles on 
range and payload, and because missiles are usually divided into categories based on 
their speed as well. The propulsion and guidance systems are also important 
characteristics, but they cannot be quantified.
299
 The specifics of each missile were 
taken from Wikipedia, militarypower.com.br, ausairpower.net, army-technology.com, 
army-guide.com, fas.org, and the website of Rosoboronexport. Missing values occur 
because some information is classified (e.g., the payload of Italy‘s Black Shark 
torpedoes), because sometimes it is unknown which version India ordered , or, in the 
case of guided bombs, because they are unpowered. 
The transfers were weighted for the amount ordered; otherwise an order of 1,000 
missiles would be equivalent to an order of 100 missiles. Bigger deals are more 
important, and variation in size occurs over the entire spectrum, although not to the 
same extent. However, there were strong outliers that could not be dropped.
300
 To deal 
with that the outliers, the size was log transformed, as untransformed it would skew 
the significance. Multiple deals for the same weapon are counted as different cases, 
because it is assumed that for new deals new tenders went out, new negotiations were 
done, and a new decision for suppliers was made. Tests showed that the data was not 
normally distributed and lacked homogeneity of variance, so a Kruskal-Wallis test was  
used to see if there were significant differences between the countries. 
6.8.2 Results 
Table 6.6 shows a complete overview of all trades per country per year, weighted and 
unweighted. Eight countries supplied missiles to India, with fifty-nine deals in total. 
Russia has the most deals (52.9 percent) when weighted, followed by Israel (25.5 
percent) and the USA (10.2 percent). Unweighted, the division is the same, with 
Russia in the top spot with 49.2 percent of the deals, Israel 25.4 percent and the USA 
10.2 percent. Looking at the frequency per year, one can see a steady supply from 
Russia, Israel‘s  sales picking up in 2000, and the USA‘s sales starting in 2010.  
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Table 6.6 Frequency of missile suppliers to India weighted (and unweighted) 1998-2014 
 France Israel Italy Kyrg. Russia Ukr. UK USA Total 
1998 0 0 0 0 10.0 (4) 0 0 0 10.0 (4) 
1999 0 0 0 0 8.0 (3) 0 0 0 8.0 (3) 
2000 0 2.3 (1) 0 0 7.4 (3) 0 0 0 9.7 (4) 
2001 0 1.5 (1) 0 0 7.1(3) 0 0 0 8.7 (4) 
2002 0 2.4 (1) 0 0 3.30 (1) 0 0 0 5.7 (2) 
2003 0 0 0 0 3.5 (1) 0 0 0 3.5(1) 
2005  1.6 (1) 3.3 (2) 0 0 5.1 (2) 0 0 0 10.0 (5) 
2006  1.9 (1) 0 0  1.6(1) 5.1 (3) 0 0 0 8.5 (5) 
2008 0 7.8 (3) 0 0 2.4 (1) 0 0 0 10.2(4) 
2009 0 9.31 (4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.3 (4) 
2010 0 0 0 0 2.7 (1) 0 0 1.3 (1) 4.0 (2) 
2011 0 0 0 1.2 (1) 6.4 (3) 0 0 1.5 (1) 9.0 (5) 
2012 2.7 (1) 2.7 (1) 0 0 6.3 (2) 2.6 (1) 0 3.3 (2) 17.6 (7) 
2013 0 0 0 0 4.4 (1) 0 0 8.03(3) 12.4. (4) 
2014 0 6.3 (2) 2.0 (1) 0 2.0 (1) 0 2.6 (1) 0 12.9 (5) 
Total          
Unweighted 3 
(5.1%) 
15 
(25.4%) 
1 
(1.7%) 
2  
(3.4%) 
29 
(49.2%) 
1 
(1.7%) 
1 
(1.7%) 
7 
(11.9%) 
59 
Weighted 6.2 
(4.4%) 
35.6 
(25.5%) 
2.0 
(1.4%) 
2.7  
(1.9%) 
73.8 
(52.9%) 
2.6 
(1.8%) 
2.5 
(1.8%) 
14.2 
(10.2%) 
129.5 
Source: Adaptation of SIPRI Arms Transfers Register. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was used to see if there was a significant difference. The 
complete results can be downloaded from a link in the Annex, and I will report only 
the significant results. The median of payload (χ2 = 25.9, p = 0.00) and speed (χ2 = 
15.7, p = 0.01) differ significantly between countries, while the range did not.
301
  
                                                 
301
 The complete result, including tests for variance of homogeneity, normality, and descriptive variables,can be 
downloaded from a link in the Annex. 
77 
 
Figure 6.1 Post-hoc tests for payload and speed for all missile suppliers 1998-2014 
Source: Adaptation of SIPRI Arms Transfers Register. 
The post-hoc tests in Figure 6.1 show that there were only a few statistically 
significant differences between countries. Significant results are lightly colored 
(yellow). The only differences in payload were that Kyrgyzstan offers heavier 
payloads than the USA and the UK. Ukraine offers faster missiles than Italy, the USA, 
and Kyrgyzstan. The underlying assumption that Russia‘s missiles were of a higher 
sensitivity than Western missiles can therefore not be confirmed. There are two 
reasons for that. First, Russia offers a wide variety in missiles, from anti-tank missiles 
(ATM) to supersonic cruise missiles, so it does not come out on top clearly. Secondly, 
the N is very small, especially split up by country. This makes it hard to get s ignificant 
results. Thirdly, non-quantifiable characteristics were not taken in account. Therefore, 
the top ten missiles in each category will also be analyzed to see whether some 
countries are ahead.  
Table 6.7 Top 10 imported missiles for India in 1998-2014: Speed 
 Country Weapon Type Amount ordered Speed (m/s) Year 
1 Ukraine R-27 BVRAAM* 360 1530 2012 
2 Israel Derby (2x) BVRAAM 750/20 1360 2008/2005 
 Israel Python-5 BVRAAM 750 1360 2008 
 France MICA BVRAAM 493 1360 2012 
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6 Russia RVV-AE (3x) BVRAAM 500/40/1000 1328 2011/2006/1999 
9 Israel Python-4 BVRAAM 100 1190 2005 
10 UK ASRAAM* SRAAM 350 1020 2014 
*BVRAAM: Beyond Visual Range Air-To-Air Missile, ASRAAM; Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile 
Source: Adaptation of SIPRI Arms Transfers Register. 
Israel features prominently on the list of fastest missiles in Table 6.7, with four entries. 
Ukraine exported the fastest missile, while the USA does not appear on this list. 
Additionally Russia and India are now jointly developing the BrahMos-II cruise 
missile, which has a speed of 2380 m/s. This is the fastest missile in the world. 
Table 6.8 Top 10 imported missiles for India in 1998-2014: Range 
 Country Weapon Type Amount ordered Range (km) Year 
1 Israel Harop SSM* 50 1000 2009 
2 Russia PJ-10 Brahmos 
(3x) 
Various** 216/400/150 290 2012/1998 (2x) 
5 Russia 3M-54 Klub (2x) Anti-ship 
missile/SSM 
150/28 220 1998/2006 
7 Russia Kh-35 Uran (3x) Anti-ship missile 100/50/30 130 2014/2011/2001 
10 USA RGM-84L 
Harpoon-2 (2x) 
Anti-ship missile 21/20 124 2012/2010 
* SSM: Surface-to-surface missiles 
** India has bought Brahmos Air-to-Surface missiles (216), surface-to-surface missiles (400) and anti-ship 
missiles (150). They differ in payload. 
Source: Adaptation of SIPRI Arms Transfers Register. 
Russia is a strong contender for missiles with the furthest range in Table 6.8, with 
eight different entries. The USA features once on this list, in the tenth spot. Israel 
supplied the missile with the highest range. This is the UCAV mentioned in the 
chapter on export regimes.  
Table 6.9 Top 10 imported missiles for India in 1998-2014: Payload 
 Country Weapon Type Amount ordered Payload (kg) Year 
1 Kyrgyzstan 
(2x) 
SET-65E ASW* torpedo 14/36 450 2011/2006 
 Israel SPICE Guided bomb 100 450 2008 
4 Russia KAB-500/1500 
(2x) 
Guided bomb 100/1000 380 2011/1998 
6 Israel AGM-142E ASM* 30 340 2001 
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7 Russia Kh-59 ME 
Ovod 
ASM* 100 320 1999 
8 Russia PJ-10 Brahmos 
(2x) 
Anti-ship 
missile/SSM 
150/400 300 1998 (2x) 
10 USA Paveway-2 Guided bomb 100 241 2012 
* ASW: Anti-submarine warfare, ASM: Air-to-surface missiles 
Source: Adaptation of SIPRI Arms Transfers Register. 
Russia is strong on the list of the heaviest payloads  in Table 6.9, with five entries. 
Kyrgyzstan has the top spots with two sales of ASW torpedoes. The USA has the tenth 
spot again. 
6.8.1 Conclusion 
These figures show that the sensitivity of missiles differs in payload and speed. On a 
pairwise level, only Kyrgyzstan offers missiles with a high payload, and Ukraine 
offers fast missiles. The small N and the high range of the characteristics likely play a 
role. The lack of significant results, and the fact that the two countries with significant 
differences had few sales, leaves doubt on the validity of this test.  Even though a 
Kruskal-Wallis test accounts for a skewed distribution and a lack of homogeneity of 
variance, the latter two are strong indicators that the data offers problems for statistical 
analysis. While quality and characteristics are not comparable over all weapon types, 
perhaps a sensitivity comparison could be repeated using the age of all imported arms. 
An overview of who sells the most sensitive missiles  per category shows that Russia 
and Israel offer missiles with better characteristics than the USA. The USA has only 
recently entered the market, but so far it does not look like the USA is replacing 
Russia or Israel for the most sensitive arms. To say this with certainty one would need 
to do a follow-up test to measure all weapon systems. 
Several conclusions can be derived from this. Russia offers the greatest variety of 
missiles to India. It offers some of the best missiles  but also a lot of garden-variety 
missiles. The missiles from the USA are not the top of the range, while Israel offers 
generally good-quality missiles. This means that at least regarding missiles, other 
countries offering more sensitive items is not the reason to divert from Russia. It is 
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interesting that some of the top missiles come from countries that do not deliver a lot 
of other missiles to India, like Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. These countries were at the 
time of the trade in the Russian sphere of influence. This makes it unlikely they would 
sell the weapons if Russia strongly disapproved. This adds further weight to the idea 
that sensitivity of weapons is not the reason to look to the West.  
6.9 Feedback loops 
All these developments also interact with each other. SIPRI writes that suppliers often 
become associated with their recipients, so supplying arms to the adversary becomes 
unthinkable out of fear of jeopardizing their relations.
302
 This is reflected in the mutual 
relations between India, Pakistan, Russia, the USA, and China. For a long time, the 
USA supplied arms to Pakistan, while Russia supplied to India. Currently, the USA 
sells more in dollars than Russia does, partially because Washington has become more 
concerned about China. Relations between the USA and Russia have also cooled, 
especially since the war in Ukraine, which could push Russia into China‘s hands. My 
final argument, using recent developments of the past year, is that relationships with 
suppliers affect relationships with other suppliers, creating feedback loops. To do so, it 
is important to look at the relations between all five countries. 
India‘s gradual shift toward the USA has led to great concern in Russia. India is an 
important market for Russia, as trade to India made up 39.3 percent of all its arms 
exports 2010–2014. Moscow does not want to lose this, especially with its weak 
economy and arms industry reforms. Russian attempts to woo India back were mainly 
geo-political maneuvers with limited success.
 303
   It stated that Russia has always had 
India‘s back, that they should bond together against the West, and that India and the 
USA cannot really trust each other.
304
 The tactic to increase co-development has paid 
off, as Russia shares more technology than the USA does. This is why Russia is still a 
strong player on the Indian arms market. 
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The relations between Pakistan and the USA are hegemonic, even more than India‘s 
relations with Russia were, as the USA offers military assistance and free weapons to 
achieve its strategic goals to Pakistan. Countering India is a priority for Pakistan. It 
feels so threatened by India and the military has such a large role in politics that 
SIPRI‘s 1971 quote that the ―quest for arms has largely determined rather than 
reflected Pakistan‘s international alignment‖ is still valid.305 Pakistan does care from 
whom it receives it arms, and it does not share a culture, religion or ideology with 
either the USA or China, its main suppliers. 
Russia used to have a moratorium on arms sales to Pakistan because it considered 
Pakistan a threat to the stability of the region. In 2012, Russian deputy prime minister 
Rogozin said to India, ―We do not do military business with your enemies. We do not 
transfer any arms to them.‖306 Then Russia announced in June 2014 that it would 
consider exporting arms to Pakistan.
307
 Pakistan will likely purchase 20 MI-35 
helicopters, especially since an Indian tender for helicopters went to the USA.
308
 This 
is largely as a response to India‘s pivot to the USA. There are several benefits for 
Russia besides financial ones. Previously, many Russian arms were illegally re-
exported to Pakistan. Now Russia can control this and benefit from it. Trade can also 
help with shared security threats, such as radical Islamists ; improve relations with 
China; and possibly decrease US influence. Finally, it can be used as leverage against 
closer Indian relations with the USA.
309
 Pakistan benefits as it receives more arms, 
which are especially useful as NATO withdraws from Afghanistan. It decreases 
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dependency on China and the USA.
310
 Russia‘s official explanation is that the arms are 
used to combat drugs and terrorism, as they affect the situation in Afghanistan. 
India is concerned about that development.
311
 Indian Navy Chief Arun Prakash stated 
that Russia likely made the offer in order to ―arm-twist‖ India into not buying from 
other suppliers.
312
 Some Indian analysts worry that Russia is mainly befriending 
Pakistan‘s army leadership, which is very anti-India.313 The director of the Russian 
Institute of Strategic Studies stated when the decision was announced, ―I do not think 
that India will have any objections. After all, India and Pakistan both buy weapons 
from the US, and this has not bothered them.‖314 It is obvious that Russia feels it is 
slightly hypocritical to criticize Russia for selling arms to Pakistan when India buys 
from the USA. However, Kadadin, Russia‘s ambassador to India, said, ―Never ever 
will Russia do anything to the detriment of India‘s security. India is the closest friend 
of my country.‖315 Overall, the Indian response has been negative but not extremely 
so, since India realizes as well that Russia has genuine security considerations in 
Pakistan, and that the sale of equipment to Pakistan would not compensate for lost 
sales with India.
316
 A visit from Putin in December 2014 has also tempered the 
anger.
317
 It is overall a symbol for the fact that the ―special relations‖ between Russia 
and India are no longer the same. As India diversifies, so does Russia. Pakistan has not 
expressed a similar anger over closer US ties with India, as it did not trust the USA 
anyway, based on its past track record. The USA used Pakistan to assist Afghan 
mujahedeen, only to drop Islamabad after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, 
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leaving Pakistan to deal with the mujahedeen.
318
 Other countries that supply to both do 
not get as much negative feedback, as those relations are not as intertwined . 
It is possible that buying arms from the USA could give India leverage over US arms 
supplies to Pakistan.
319
 As the USA dropped Pakistan before, it is not unthinkable that 
that could happen again in the future if that offered more strategic benefits. However, 
trade between the USA and Pakistan has not changed yet. The yearly percentages are 
volatile but do not suggest a clear trend downward. The five-year periods only show 
an increase toward the highest share in 2010–2014 (30 percent) since 1985–1989 (48 
percent). Influence the other way round is also possible. India was concerned it would 
be coerced into making concessions about Kashmir in order to let Pakistan focus on 
fighting Islamist terrorists, like the UK had suggested. With the withdrawal of US 
troops from Afghanistan, it is unlikely the USA would demand that of India. It might 
ask for other strategic favors in the future, though. 
Table 6.10 Share of US arms in total Pakistani arms imports in TIV 1970-2014 
 ’70-’74 ’75-’79 ’80-’84 ’85-’89 ’90-’94 ’95-’99 ’00-’04 ’05-’09 ’10-’14 
USA 5% 15% 30% 48% 5% 12% 3% 27% 30% 
Source: SIPRI Arms Trade Database 
China also plays a role. The Russia-China relations are complex. China offers 
opportunities to Russia for trade and military cooperation but is a threat at the same 
time.
320
 Relations have improved over the past decades, and China is Russia‘s biggest 
trade partner.
321
 Russian-Chinese defense cooperation has grown substantially but did 
not come from the ground easily, due to mutual misunderstanding and mistrust.
322
 The 
partnership was built on a mutual fear of the USA instead of a positive attitude toward 
each other.
323
 China used to be a faithful customer of arms since 1992 but has now 
developed its own industry, and sales have decreased sharply since 2006. Russia is 
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annoyed that China most likely reverse-engineered many Russian arms and made 
Chinese copies.
324
 China wants to buy Su-35 advanced fighter aircrafts, but Russia 
wants to sell more than China wants to buy.
 325
 This is possibly Russia‘s strategy to 
make the sale worthwhile despite the risk of reverse engineering.
326
 India objects to 
this deal. Due to a lack of transparency about Chinese armaments, it is hard to 
compare equipment India and China receive from Russia.
327
 If they are equal, India 
does not have the qualitative edge on China it desires.
 
If China copies the Su-35 
aircrafts, the technology might proliferate to Pakistan as well, since China and 
Pakistan are jointly developing defense technology, such as the JF-17 combat aircraft.
 
328
 This aircraft has a Russian engine, and Russia gave approval for the direct export of 
that engine to Pakistan in February, after Putin‘s visit to India where he promised to 
not go against India‘s strategic interests.329 Just like India, Russia is also trying to 
engage multilaterally, balancing different interests.  
These feedback loops lead to the following model on arms trade relations. Improving 
India-USA relations have a negative effect on India-Russia relations. In response, 
Pakistan-Russia relations improve, which has in turn a negative effect on the India-
Russia relations, resulting in a negative feedback spiral. If India is able to obtain 
leverage and influence the USA-Pakistan relations, more feedback would occur. If 
Russia and China get closer and more Russian technology gets delivered to Pakistan 
through China, India and Russia‘s relations would likely become more strained.  
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7 Conclusion 
I started writing with the assumption that India‘s close ties with Russia were a thing of 
the past, and as the economy grew and India started maintaining close strategic ties 
with the West, Western countries became more interested to supply arms to India. But 
the situation turned out to be a lot more complicated.  
First, I want to add nuance to the idea that the USA is the most important defense trade 
partner for India. Trade with the USA has the highest financial value now, but there 
are other characteristics to judge how important a supplier is. Is importance based on 
financial value, or volume of the trade; the level of innovation, age, or sensitivity of 
the weapons; the trust between countries; or how much technology India can get out of 
it to develop its own industry, a major goal for New Delhi? The USA does not score 
the highest on all of these categories. There are still substantial hiccups in their arms  
trade relations. India disapproves of the USA restricting technology transfer, 
modification, and re-exports of goods, and not helping India with its bid for the export 
control regimes. The USA does not trade arms of the highest technology or sensitivity 
levels (probably), nor does it offer India the latest weapons it owns. They have 
indubitably made great strides, but the situation deserves more nuance than it is 
generally given. Relations with Russia have worsened in some aspects. The financial 
value has gone down, Russia cannot supply the most innovative weapons, Russia 
might trade with Pakistan now, and there are concerns about delays, spares and 
malfunctions. But there are also strong aspects. Russia transfers highly sensitive 
weapons, the latest weapons it owns; is willing to cooperate extensively on developing 
weapons; transfers high amounts of technology; and still supplies the greatest volume. 
Secondly, all the mentioned motivations, decisions , and developments can be 
synthesized in one bigger strategy specifically for choosing arms suppliers. It is said 
that India does not prioritize military matters, lacks long-term planning, has non-
integrated doctrines from separate services , shows a disconnect between objectives  
and technology, and retains strong civilian control over the military. I do not disagree 
with these observations. There is indeed a clear lack of strategic thinking about what to 
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buy, how to buy, when to buy, who should make the choices, and how to regulate. The 
wish lists of the different military branches are uncoordinated, with unrealistic 
demands, and the strategic purpose often unclear. Procurement procedures are difficult 
to understand. The budget does not account for long-term planning or show strategic 
priorities. The institutions have competing interests, with little coordination or external 
control. But the lack of strategy does not extend to one question: whom to buy from. 
I propose that maintaining strategic autonomy in arms procurement is a strategy of its 
own, fitting the greater strategy of Non-Alignment 2.0. I do not claim that this is what 
government officials actively think, just that it is a pattern shown repeatedly. In theory, 
strategic autonomy refers to increasing one‘s options by engaging with all possible 
actors, but in practice this has long been done with an anti-Western view. Under Non-
Alignment 2.0, this is no longer the case. Instead, India maximizes its options with all 
foreign powers in order to have maximum options to develop domestically. With more 
suppliers, suppliers have less leverage, and India has more room to maneuver. New 
Delhi is afraid of getting cut off again during conflicts, and the economy has grown 
strongly. Becoming independent has thus become a focal point. India‘s attempts to 
increase independence, decrease leverage, strengthen India, and maximize options can 
be consistently seen in its supplier picks. India invests in the domestic industry, picks 
suppliers who are willing to supply technology for the domestic industry, chooses 
suppliers who will try to gain as little influence over India as possible, diversifies the 
suppliers, improves strategic ties to have more options , and attempts to join export 
control regimes to get a seat at the global table. This is a change from the Cold War, as  
the multipolar world led to industrial motives for suppliers, which decreases India‘s 
hesitance toward Western arms. Finally, the development of India‘s own industry, 
bigger budgets, decreased tolerance for Russian mishaps, and a qualitative arms race 
with China have increased the desire for Western technology.  
There are several problems with this thesis. As with all arms trade research, there are 
few primary sources. Datasets are conflicting, and there is little transparency about 
why decisions are made. This has led to a lot of speculation. I mention many political 
considerations to choose the Rafale, but technical details might have been the reason. I 
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cannot tell for sure. I am missing perspectives from Russia, France, and Israel 
especially. That is caused by language barriers, but Israel and Russia are also very 
secretive about their defense trade. Even in my own language Dutch there is little 
material about arms trade between the Netherlands and India. I have attempted to not 
let the US perspective drown out other perspectives, but US sources are still dominant. 
Finally, some of the debates have been presented only briefly, due to a lack of space 
and an attempt to focus specifically on arms suppliers. This has made the debate on 
many aspects less nuanced than it deserves, like the other problems with procurement, 
corruption, strategy, non-alignment, new technology, and all bilateral relations. 
This thesis has also opened up opportunities for further research. There are several 
statistical tests that would be illuminating, such as a complete assessment of 
sensitivity, a comparison per supplier between the ages of arms sold to India and 
Pakistan, or a comparison per supplier of the differences in domestic models and 
export models of arms. I could not do most of these, as I lacked access to sources 
about their specific characteristics. In addition, more research should be done on 
bilateral relations with many smaller trade partners. Finally, it will be incredibly 
interesting to see what the future holds. India has a 12-billion-USD tender coming up 
for six stealth submarines that will have to be manufactured in India. France, Spain, 
Russia, Sweden, and Germany are allegedly competing.
330
 To whom shall it go? Other 
developments also inspire curiosity. Will Modi‘s policies lead to buying more US 
arms? Will India be accepted in the MTCR, and will that lead to increased missile 
trade and/or acceptance in the NSG? How will the war in Crimea affect arms sold to 
India, and how will that affect India‘s relations with the USA and Russia? How many 
arms will Russia sell to Pakistan and China, and how will that affect India-Russia 
relations? Will Japan and South Korea start to trade actively with India, and how will 
China respond? The situation is always evolving and so exciting that it is worth 
keeping an eye out. 
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8 Annex 
Table 8.1 Arms trade per country to India in TIV per five years 1970-2014 
 ’70-’74 ’75-’79 ’80-’84 ’85-’89 ’90-’94 ’95-’99 ’00-’04 ’05-’09 ’10-’14 
Australia 34 0 0 0 0 0 17 59 34 
Canada 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 36 
Czechoslovakia 128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 120 144 233 1479 314 219 237 145 247 
Germany  0 115 3 554 600 64 231 98 152 
Ghana 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 116 522 657 1543 
Italy 36 6 15 8 0 9 57 24 347 
Japan 0 0 34 26 0 0 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 9 6 0 0 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 54 76 36 0 
Netherlands 7 24 40 176 650 518 93 35 32 
Poland 0 227 115 103 0 6 177 319 11 
Russia/Soviet 5185 5478 8381 14296 4773 4383 7077 6419 14686 
Singapore 0 0 0 38 19 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 139 52 0 0 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 18 15 0 66 
South Korea 0 0 0 36 216 120 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 355 55 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 0 525 875 175 0 0 0 0 60 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 21 119 205 0 203 
UK 1670 1261 2121 1718 762 319 122 617 690 
United States 2 0 0 45 36 12 14 168 2516 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 378 209 418 
Total 7182 7786 11817 19034 7446 6105 9279 8786 21041 
N suppliers 8 9 9 14 10 15 16 12 15 
Source: SIPRI Arms Trade Database 
Table 8.2 Share of total arms trade per country to India in TIV per five years 1970-2014 
 ’70-’74 ’75-’79 ’80-’84 ’85-’89 ’90-’94 ’95-’99 ’00-’04 ’05-’09 ’10-’14 
Australia 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.2% 
Canada 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
Czechoslovakia 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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France 1.7% 1.9% 2.0% 7.8% 4.2% 3.6% 2.6% 1.7% 1.2% 
Germany  0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 2.9% 8.1% 1.1% 2.5% 1.1% 0.7% 
Ghana 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Israel 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 5.6% 7.5% 7.3% 
Italy 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.6% 0.3% 1.7% 
Japan 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Kazakhstan 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Kyrgyzstan 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.4% 0.0% 
Netherlands 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.9% 8.7% 8.5% 1.0% 0.4% 0.2% 
Poland 0.0% 2.9% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 1.9% 3.6% 0.1% 
Russia/Soviet 72.2% 70.4% 70.9% 75.1% 64.1% 71.8% 76.3% 73.1% 69.8% 
Singapore 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Slovakia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
South Africa 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 
South Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 2.9% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Sweden 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Switzerland 0.0% 6.7% 7.4% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
Ukraine 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 2.0% 2.2% 0.0% 1.0% 
UK 23.3% 16.2% 18.0% 9.0% 10.2% 5.2% 1.3% 7.0% 3.3% 
United States 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 1.9% 12.0% 
Uzbekistan 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.1% 2.4% 2.0% 
Source: Adaptation of the SIPRI Arms Trade Database 
 
Figure 8.1 Share of licensing vs. direct sales for India 1970–2014 
Source: Adaptation of SIPRI Arms Transfers Register. 
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Table 8.3 Descriptive variables for range, speed, and payload of Indian missiles per supplier 1998–2014 
Country Category N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
France speed (m/s) 6 309 1360 920.5 467.4 
range (km) 6 6 50 36.3 22.3 
load (kg) 6 3 165 47.8 74.5 
Israel speed (m/s) 28 41 1360 782.4 424.3 
range (km) 36 8 1000 70.1 212.1 
load (kg) 33 11 450 75.4 117.3 
Italy speed (m/s) 2 26 26 26.0 0.0 
range (km) 2 50 50 50.0 0.0 
load (kg) 0         
Kyrgyzstan speed (m/s) 3 26 26 26.0 0.0 
range (km) 3 100 100 100.0 0.0 
load (kg) 3 450 450 450.0 0.0 
Russia speed (m/s) 69 10 1328 649.7 408.1 
range (km) 74 4 500 75.0 114.3 
load (kg) 74 1.5 380 99.2 119.9 
Ukraine speed (m/s) 3 1530 1530 1530.0 0.0 
range (km) 3 100 100 100.0 0.0 
load (kg) 3 39 39 39.0 0.0 
United 
Kingdom 
speed (m/s) 3 1020 1020 1020.0 0.0 
range (km) 3 15 15 15.0 0.0 
load (kg) 3 10 10 10.0 0.0 
United 
States 
speed (m/s) 12 21 750 409.9 230.2 
range (km) 14 8 124 30.7 46.2 
load (kg) 14 3 241 84.3 107.0 
Source: Adaptation of SIPRI Arms Transfers Register. 
 
Extra material is available to download at https://goo.gl/wp8294.This includes: 
SIPRI tables of annual arms trade per supplier in TIV 
SIPRI tables of annual arms trade per supplier in share of the total imports 
SIPRI data on the top 5 importers compared 
Combined SIPRI Arms Trade Register 
Missile trade dataset with characteristics, including propulsion system and guidance 
Exploratory tests on missile trade datasets 
Results of Kruskal-Willis test on missiles 
Additional data can be made available upon request. 
91 
 
9 References 
Ahlström, C. ―Arrows for India? Technology transfers for ballistic missile defence and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime.‖ Journal of Conflict & Security Law 9 (2004): 103-125. Accessed July 
20, 2015. doi: 10.1093/jcsl/9.1.103 
Akhbar, Z. ―Central Asia: The new great game.‖ The Washington review of Turkish and Eurasian 
Affairs, October, 2012. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/central-
asia-the-new-great-game.html. 
Anand, D. ―India revives joint missile project with French firm.‖ DNA India, March 31, 2015. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-revives-joint-missile-project-with-
french-firm-2073368. 
Ansari, U. ―Russia-Pakistan deal may lead to more sales.‖ Defense News, February 16, 2015. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-
budget/industry/2015/02/16/russian-pakistani-engine-deal-could-lead-to-further-equipment-
sales/23519813/. 
―Arms trade in the age of turbulence: The crisis in Ukraine, Western sanctions, and the Russian 
defense industry.‖ Security Index:A Russian journal on international security 20 (2014): 103-109. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1080/19934270.2014.986371. 
Bajpaj, K. ―NAM and the pitfalls of revisiting it.‖ Business Standard, March 6, 2012. Acessed July 20, 
2015. http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/k-shankar-bajpai-nam-and-the-pitfalls-of-
revisiting-it-112030600022_1.html. 
Balachandran, G. ―Time to ban import of lopsides opinions on Indian defence.‖ The Pioneer, 
November 8, 2014. Accessed July 4, 2015. http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/time-to-
ban-import-of-lopsided-opinions-on-indian-defence.html. 
Banerjee, D. ―India‘s defence and security in the 21st century: Hard choices.‖ Center for Land 
Warfare Studies (2014): 1-16. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1028663823_DipankarBanerjee.pdf. 
Baskaran, A. ―The role of offsets in Indian defence procurement policy.‖ In Arms trade and economic 
development: Theory, policy and cases in arms trade offsets, edited by Jurgen Brauer and J. Dunne, 
217-232. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004. 
Basrur, R. Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2006. 
Bedi, R. ―US overtakes Russia as India‘s main supplier.‖ IHS Jane’s 360, August 12, 2014. Accessed 
on July 4, 2015. http://www.janes.com/article/41867/us-overtakes-russia-as-india-s-main-materiel-
supplier. 
Bedi, R. and Hardy, J. ―Parrikar heading to Tokyo with US-2, closer strategic ties on the agenda.‖ IHS 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 23, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.janes.com/article/50147/parrikar-heading-to-tokyo-with-us-2-closer-strategic-ties-on-the-
agenda. 
Behera, L. ―‘Make in India‘ for defence: A roadmap.‘ IDSA Policy Brief (2015): 1-8. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://www.idsa.in/policybrief/MakeinIndiaforDefence_lbehera_050215.html. 
 92 
 
Bhowmick, B. ―Enter the elephant: India looks to overhaul its military.‖ Time, April 3, 2012. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. http://world.time.com/2012/04/03/indias-military-overhaul-through-export-
and-import-defense-spending-a-priority/. 
Bin, Y. ―China-Russia relations: Tales of different ‗pivots.‘‖ Comparative Connection (2013): 1-9. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://csis.org/files/publication/1203qchina_russia.pdf. 
Bitzinger, R. ―The Indian defence industry: Struggling with change.‖ In India’s Military 
Modernization: Challenges and prospects, edited by Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeet 
Pardesi, 117-139. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 
0.1093/acprof:oso/9780198092384.003.0005. 
———. ―Indian-Israeli defence cooperation: The elusive partnership.‖ S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies 55 (2013): 1-2. Accessed July 20, 2015. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/CO13055.pdf. 
———. ―Israeli arms transfers to India: Ad hoc defence cooperation or the beginnings of a strategic 
partnership?‖ S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Policy Brief (2013): 1-6. Accessed July 5, 
2015. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/219-israeli-arms-transfers-to-indi/. 
———. Towards a brave new arms industry? London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2003. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1080/714027877. 
Borah, R. ―Anchoring Indo-Japanese maritime relations.‖ Institute for Security & Development Policy 
Policy Brief 180 (2015): 1-2. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-
pdf/2015-borah-anchoring-indo-japanese-maritime-relations.pdf. 
Brannen, S. ―Sustaining the U.S. lead in unmanned systems: Military and homeland considerations 
through 2025,‖ Center for Strategic and International Studies (2014): 1-25. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://csis.org/files/publication/140227_Brannen_UnmannedSystems_Web.pdf . 
Brauer, J. ―Arms industries, arms trade and developing countries.‖ In Handbook of defence economics, 
edited by Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, 973-1015. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007. Accessed July 5, 
2015. doi:10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02030-8. 
Brewster, D. ―Australia and India: the Indian Ocean and the limits of strategic convergence.‖ 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 64 (2010): 549-565. Accessed July 5, 2015, doi: 
10.1080/10357718.2010.513369. 
Briganti, G. de. ―The real reasons for Rafale‘s Indian victory.‖ Defence Aerospace, February 1, 2012. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/132379/why-rafale-
won-in-india.html. 
Burns, N. ―Passage to India: What Washington can do to revive relations with New Delhi.‖ Foreign 
Affairs 93 (2014: 132-143. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora93&id=1138&collection=journals. 
Campbell, K. and N. Andrews. ―Explaining the US ‗pivot‘ to Asia.‖ Chatham House Research Paper 
(2013), 1-9. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/194019. 
Chacko, P. ―A new ‗special relationship‘? Power transitions, ontological security and India-US 
relations.‖ International Studies Perspective 15 (2014): 329-346. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 
10.1111/insp.12029. 
Chandramohan, B. ―India‘s defence budget, strategic orientation and military modernisation.‖ Future 
Directions International. August 15, 2014. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://apo.org.au/research/indias-
defence-budget-strategic-orientation-and-military-modernisation. 
93 
 
Chellaney, B. ―Built on hype, deflated by reality,‖ The Hindu, July 24, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/indous-nuclear-deal-built-on-hype-deflated-by-
reality/article7418025.ece?homepage=true. 
———. ―End-use monitoring woes for India.‖ The Hindu, July 27, 2009. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/enduse-monitoring-woes-for-
india/article239784.ece. 
―China to invest $20 billion in India in next 5 years, much less than Japan‘s offer of $35 billion.‖ 
Times of India, September 18, 2014. Accessed July 4, 2015. 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-to-invest-20-billion-in-India-in-next-5-years-much-
less-than-Japans-offer-of-35-billion/articleshow/42814025.cms. 
Chiriyankandath, J. ―Realigning Indian foreign policy after the Cold War.‖ The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 93 (2007): 199-211. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 
10.1080/00358530410001679567. 
Chowdhury, J.―India watches warily as Russia deepens ties with neighbors.‖ RT, January 10, 2015. 
accessed July 5, 2015. http://rt.com/op-edge/221411-russia-relations-india-military-economy/.  
 
Cohen, S. and S. Dasgupta. Arming without aiming: India’s military modernization. Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2010. 
 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India. ―Production and supply of Advanced Light Helicopter: 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.‖ Performance audit of Activities of Public Sector Undertakings 10 
(2010/11): 22-35. Accessed July 5, 2015, 
http://www.saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/Government_Wise/union_audit/
recent_reports/union_performance/2010_2011/Commercial/Report_no_10/Report_no_10.html. 
Craig, T. ―As Obama visits India, Pakistan looks to Russia for military, economic assistance.‖ 
Washington Post, January 28, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-obama-visits-india-pakistan-looks-to-russia-
for-military-economic-assistance/2015/01/28/fee988f0-a58a-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440_story.html. 
Dasgupta, S. and S. Cohen. ―Arms sales for India: How military trade could energize U.S.-Indian 
relations.‖ Foreign Affairs 90 (2011): 22-26. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25800454.pdf. 
Dash, P. ―Indo-Russian defence ties: An overdependence dilemma.‖ In India’s military 
modernization: Challenges and prospects, edited by Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeet 
Pardesi, 259-281. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198092384.001.0001. 
Dattay-Ray, D. The making of Indian diplomacy: A critique of Eurocentrism. Oxford University Press, 
2015. 
Delpech, T. Nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: Lessons from the Cold War for a new era of 
strategic piracy. Santa Monica: Rand, 2012. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1103.pdf. 
Dhume, S. ―Failure 2.0.‖ Foreign Policy. March 16, 2012. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/16/failure-2-0/. 
———. ―Revealed: The India-Israel axis.‖ Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/revealed-the-india-israel-axis-1406133666. 
 94 
 
Dunne, J., M. García-Alonso, P. Levine, and R.Smith. ―Concentration in the international arms 
industry.‖ Paper presented at the Middlesex conference on security, 2001, and the ECAAR Atlanta 
meetings, 2002. April 20, 2002. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://carecon.org.uk/Armsproduction/Papers/conc2621.PDF. 
Dyner, A. ―What ending cooperation on armaments means for Russia and Ukraine.‖ Polish Institute 
for International Affairs Bulletins 645 (2014): 1-2. Accessed July 20, 201. 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=179071&lng=en. 
Engelbrekt, K. and Watts, J. ―Sino-Russian strategic collaboration: Still an ‗Axis of convenience‘?‖ 
Swedish National Defence College (2015), 1-62. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/forskning/Forskningsprojekt/Statsvet/Forbe/Still%20An
%20Axis%20of%20Convenience.pdf. 
Fang, T. Asymmetrical threat perceptions in India-China relation. New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198095958.001.0001. 
Feigenbaum, E. ―India‘s rise, America‘s interest: The fate of the U.S.-Indian partnership.‖ Foreign 
Affairs 89 (2010): 76-91. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699852. 
Fidler, D. and S. Ganguly. ―India and Eastphalia,‖ Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 17 (2010): 
149-154. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.2979/gls.2010.17.1.147. 
Gady, F. ―India and Japan continue to deepen their defense ties.‖ The Diplomat, April 1, 2015. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/india-and-japan-continue-to-deepen-their-
defense-ties/. 
´Gady, F. ―Will India purchase German stealth submarines?‖ The Diplomat. May 27, 2015. Accessed 
July 20, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/will-india-purchase-german-stealth-submarines/. 
Gajare, R., A. Mahawar and S. Maheshwari. ―Defence: gunning for indigenous fire power.‖ Edelweiss 
Security Limited (2014): 1-252. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.edelresearch.com/showreportpdf-
26476/DEFENCE-_SECTOR_UPDATE-JUL-14-EDEL. 
García-Alonso, M. and P. Levine. ―Arms trade and arms races: A strategic analysis.‖ In Handbook of 
defence economics, edited by Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, 941-971. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. doi:10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02029-1. 
Gerring, J. Case study research: Principles and practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 
Gokhale, N. ―INS Vikramaditya, India‘s biggest warship, finally arrives.‖ NDTV, January 5, 2014. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/ins-vikramaditya-indias-biggest-warship-
finally-arrives-546845. 
―Gorshkov price settled at 2.3 billion.‖ Hindustan Times, December 17, 2009. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/gorshkov-price-settled-at-2-3-billion/article1-487615.aspx. 
Gratz, J. ―Russia‘s military reform: Progress and hurdles.‖ Center for Security Studies 152 (2014): 1-3. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSSAnalyse152-EN.pdf. 
Green, M. ―Japan, India, and the strategic triangle with China.‖ In Strategic Asia 2011-2012: Asia 
responds to its rising powers: China and India, edited by Ashley Tellis, Travis Tanner and Jessica 
Keough, 130-161. Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012. 
Gupta, A. Global security watch: India. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012. 
95 
 
Gupta, S. ―Back to the drawing board on US-India relations?‖ East Asia Forum, August 19, 2014. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/08/19/back-to-the-drawing-board-on-us-
india-relations. 
Hall, I. ―A strategy for India: Nonalignment 2,0?‖ Lowy Interpreter, March 6, 2012. Accessed July 20, 
2015. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/03/06/A-strategy-for-India-Nonalignment-20.aspx. 
Harkavy, R. The arms trade and international systems. Cambridge, USA: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1975. 
———. ―The changing international system and the arms trade.‖ The Annals 535 (1994): 11-28. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1177/0002716294535001002. 
Hartley, K. ―The arms industry, procurement and industrial policies.‖ In Handbook of defence 
economics, edited by Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, 1139-1176. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. doi:10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02033-3. 
Hobson, P. ―Weak Russian economic data blunt Putin‘s optimism.‖ The Moscow Times, April 19, 
2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/weak-russian-
economic-data-blunt-putins-optimism/519340.html. 
―IAF‘s sourcing spares for MIG planes from outside Russia ‗wrong.‘‖, Hindustan Times, March 26, 
2012. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/iaf-s-sourcing-spares-for-mig-
planes-from-outside-russia-wrong-envoy/article1-831186.aspx. 
―India & Israel‘s Barak-8 SAM development project(s).‖ Defense Industry Daily, March 2, 2015. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/india-israel-introducing-mr-sam-03461/. 
―India blacklists Russian defense company.‖ Sputnik, March 7, 2012. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://sputniknews.com/world/20120307/171845080.html. 
―India eyes US aircraft carrier technology,‖ The Times of India, February 4, 2015. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-eyes-US-aircraft-carrier-
technology/articleshow/46122741.cms. 
―India is world‘s fastest growing economy. Can it last?‖ CNN, April 14, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/14/investing/india-economy-fastest-growing/. 
 ―India receives last of 3 follow-on Krivak III/Talwar class frigates from Russia.‖ Defense Industry 
Daily, June 30, 2013. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/india-orders-3-
more-krivak-iiitalwar-class-frigates-02448/. 
―Indian army opts to buy Israeli Spike multi-purpose missiles.‖ Defense Update, October 25, 2014. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. http://defense-update.com/20141025_indian-army-opts-to-buy-israeli-spike-
multi-purpose-missiles.html. 
―INS Vikramaditya: India‘s new carrier.‖ Defense Industry Daily, July 16, 2015. Accessed July 16, 
2015. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ins-vikramaditya-may-hit-delay-cost-increases-03283/. 
―Italy among world‘s top arms exporters.‖ The Local, March 16, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.thelocal.it/20150316/italy-among-worlds-top-arms-exporters. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The military balance 2015. London: Routledge, 2015. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. doi:10.1080/04597222.2015.996361. 
Iyer-Mitra, A. ―Technology and military escalation in South Asia.‖ Seminar. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, June 3, 2014. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/03/technology-and-military-escalation-in-south-asia/hbbv. 
 96 
 
Jacob, J. ―Getting real: India prunes wishlist on 4 export regimes.‖ Hindustan Times, January 16, 
2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/getting-real-india-prunes-
wishlist-on-4-export-regimes/article1-1307617.aspx. 
Jha, S. ―Vladimir Putin‘s productive India visit.‖ The Diplomat, December 12, 2014. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/vladimir-putins-productive-india-visit/. 
Johnson, R. ―Analysis: India faces crunch decision over Rafale, PAK-FA.‖ Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
April 8, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.janes.com/article/50530/analysis-india-faces-
crunch-decision-over-rafale-pak-fa. 
Johnson, J. and A. Kazmin. ―India under fire for its military aid to Burma.‖ Financial Times, 
December 8, 2006. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3839997c-85c0-11db-86d5-
0000779e2340.html#axzz3dF1ZEDP3. 
Joshi, S. ―A paradigm trap,‖ The Caravan, May 1, 2012, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.caravanmagazine.in/perspectives/paradigm-trap. 
Juster, K. and A. Kuntamukkala. ―U.S.-India Initiative Series: Unleashing U.S.-India defense trade.‖ 
Center for New American Studies Working Paper (2010): 1-16. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.cnas.org/publications/working-papers/unleashing-u-s-india-defense-trade. 
Kalyanaraman, S. ―The limits of the India-United Kingdom defence Relationship.‖ Journal of Defence 
Studies 7 (2013): 229-238. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.idsa.in/jds/7_1_2013_TheLimitsoftheIndiaUnitedKingdomDefenceRelationship_SKalyana
raman.html. 
Kampani, G. ―Placing the Indo-Pakistani standoff in perspective.‖ Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (2002). Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://cns.miis.edu/reports/pdfs/indopak.pdf. 
Kanwal, G. ―India‘s defense budget is inadequate for military modernization.‖ Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, March 12, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://csis.org/publication/indias-
defense-budget-inadequate-military-modernization. 
Kapisthalam, K. ―What‘s behind the DRDO bashing?‖ The Rediff Special, January 19, 2005. Accessed 
on July 4, 2015. http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/jan/20spec1.htm. 
Kaplan, R. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York: Random 
House, 2010. 
Karp, A. and R: Rajagopalan. ―Small arms and the Indian state: A century of procurement and 
production.‖ Small Arms Survey Issue Brief 4 (2014), 1-12. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.india-
ava.org/fileadmin/docs/pubs/IAVA-IB4-small-arms-of-indian-state.pdf 
Katoch, P. ―OROP – diminutive in deeper malaise,‖ Indian Defence Review, May 25, 2005. Accessed 
July 20, 2015. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/orop-diminutive-in-deeper-malaise/. 
Katz, A. ―Indian business bullish on Russia as investment partner.‖ Russia & India report, June 19, 
2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://in.rbth.com/economics/2015/06/19/indian_business_bullish_on_russia_as_investment_partner_4
3779.html. 
Kaur, K. Defence acquisitions and offsets: The road ahead. New Delhi: Kalpana Shukla, 2013. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.claws.in/images/publication_pdf/457520731_MP4218-11-13.pdf. 
97 
 
Keck, Z. ―India eyes drone-launched smart bombs.‖ The Diplomat, August 29, 2013. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/india-eyes-drone-launched-smart-bombs/. 
———. ―Russia ends arms embargo against Pakistan.‖ The Diplomat, June 4, 2014. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/russia-ends-arms-embargo-against-pakistan/. 
——— . ―Why did BRICS back Russia on Crimea?‖ The Diplomat, March 31, 2014. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/why-did-brics-back-russia-on-crimea/. 
Kemburi, K. and R. Bitzinger. ―Cruise missiles in India: Key operational and technological issues.‖ In 
India’s Military Modernization: Strategic technologies and weapon systems, edited by Rajesh Basrur 
and Bharath Gopalaswamy, 193-229. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Khan, F. ―Prospects for Indian and Pakistani arms control.‖ In The next arms race, edited by Henry 
Sokolski, 357-384. Carlise: Strategic Studies Institute , 2012. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.npolicy.org/thebook.php?bid=26. 
Khilnani, S., R. Kumar, P. Bhanu Mehta, P. Menon, N. Nilekani, S. Raghaven, S. Saran, S. 
Varadarajan. Nonalignment 2.0: A foreign and strategic policy for India in the Twenty First Century. 
New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/working_papers/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf 
Kinsella, D. ―The arms trade.‖ In The handbook on the political economy of war, edited by 
Christopher Coyne and Rachel Mathers, 217-242. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011. 
——— . ―Changing structure of the arms trade: A social network analysis.‖ Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28-31, 2003. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=polisci_fac. 
——— . ―Power transition theory and the global arms trade: Exploring constructs from social network 
analysis.‖ Paper presented at the Fifth Power Transition Conference, Carmel, August 20-22, 2004. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://web.pdx.edu/~kinsella/papers/ptt04.pdf. 
Kiyota, T. ―Forward together we go with Japan: ‗Dazzling‘ US India rapprochement for Tokyo.‖ 
Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum, October 6, 2014. Accessed July 20, 
2015. http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1474_0.pdf. 
Klein, M. and K. Peter. ―Russia‘s armed forces on modernisation course.‖ Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik Comments 9 (2014): 1-7. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C09_kle_pst.pdf. 
Kohli, H. ―The ties that don‘t (yet) bind: India‘s uncertain role in the United States‘ ‗rebalance‘ to the 
Asia Pacific.‖ S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Policy Brief (2014): 1-7. Accessed July 
20, 2015. http://pub.iges.or.jp/modules/rssc/forward.php?fid=651094. 
Krause, K. Arms and the state: Patterns of military production and trade. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. 
Krepinevich, A. ―The Pentagon‘s wasting assets: The eroding foundations of American power.‖ 
Foreign Affairs 88 (2009): 17-33. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://ece.wpi.edu/courses/ee579sw/ECE579S/Pentagons_Wasting_Assets.pdf. 
Kugelman, M. and R. Vickery. ―From ‗looking‘ East to ‗Acting‘ East: India‘s own pivot to Asia.‖ The 
Diplomat, October 10, 2014. Accessed 5 July 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/from-looking-
east-to-acting-east-indias-own-pivot-to-asia/. 
 98 
 
Kumar, S., S. Pradhan, K. Sibal, R. Bedi, and S. Ganguly. ―India‘s strategic partners: A comparative 
assessment.‖ Foundation for National Security Research (2011): 1-15. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://fnsr.org/files/Indias_Strategic.pdf. 
Kutty, S. ― ‗Make in India‘ and defence: Modi‘s outreach to South Korea.‖ S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies 132 (2015): 1-3. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=188042. 
Ladwig, W. ―A Cold Start for hot wars? The Indian Army‘s Limited War Doctrine.‖ International 
Security 32 (2007/ 08): 158-190. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158. 
———. ―India and military power projection.‖ Asian Survey 50 (2010): 1162-1183. Accessed July 20, 
2015. doi: S.2010.50.6.1162. 
Lakshman, N. ―Why India talked up a U.S. carrier deal.‖ Bloomberg, March 4, 2008. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-03-04/why-india-talked-up-a-u-dot-s-dot-carrier-
dealbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice. 
Latif, A. ―Defense offsets in India.‖ Center for Strategic and International Studies Commentaries, 
August 16, 2012. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://csis.org/publication/defense-offsets-india. 
Latsch, G. and P. Rao. ―Dubioser Waffenhandel: Deutsche Knarren für den Zigarenkönig [Dubious 
arms trade: German guns for the cigar king].‖ Der Spiegel, November 16, 2011. Accessed July 20, 
2015. http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/dubioser-waffenhandel-deutsche-knarren-fuer-
den-zigarrenkoenig-a-797640.html 
Lee, L. ―Russia‘s engagement of India: Securing the longevity of a ‗special and privileged‘ strategic 
partnership.‖ In The engagement of India: Strategies and responses, edited by Ian Hall, 61-88. 
Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014. 
Lo, B. Axis of convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the new geopolitics. Washington: Brookings 
Institutions Press, 2008. 
Malhotra, T. ―India angry over UK decision to renew arms sales to Pakistan.‖ CNS News, July 7, 
2008. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/india-angry-over-uk-decision-renew-
arms-sales-pakistan. 
Matthews, R. and A. Lozano. ―India‘s defence acquisition and offset strategy.‖ In India’s military 
modernization: Challenges and prospects, edited by Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeet 
Pardesi, 140-168. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
McMahon, R. ―On the periphery of a global conflict: India and the Cold War, 1947-1991.‖ In India in 
the world since 1947, edited by Andreas Hilger and Corinna Unger, 276-299. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 
2012.  
Mearsheimer, J. ―Can China rise peacefully?‖ The National Interest, October 25, 2014. Accessed July 
5, 2015.  http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204. 
Medcalf, R. ―Grand stakes: Australia‘s future between China and India.‖ In Strategic Asia 2011-2012: 
Asia responds to its rising powers: China and India, edited by Ashley Tellis, Travis Tanner and 
Jessica Keough, 195-226. Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012. 
Melito, T. Nonproliferation: Agencies could improve information sharing and end-use monitoring on 
unmanned aerial vehicle exports. (GAO-12-536). Washington: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2012. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-536. 
99 
 
Menon, J. and A. Svitak. ―India rethinking Rafale fighter deal.‖ Aerospace Daily and Defence Report, 
April 13, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://aviationweek.com/defense/india-rethinking-rafale-
fighter-deal. 
Merrington, L. ―India and China: Strategic engagements in Central Asia.‖ In The engagement of India: 
Strategies and responses, edited by Ian Hall, 89-100. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 
2014. 
Metzger, R. ―US-India defence cooperation: Towards an enduring relationship.‖ Indian Defence 
Review 27 (2012): 60-66. 
Mian, Z. and M. Ramana. ―Imbricated regional rivalries and global order: South Asia, China and the 
United States.‖ Paper for Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (2010). Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/faculty-staff/zia-mian/ImbricatedRegionalRivalries.pdf. 
Ming Cheung, T. ‖Dragon on the horizon: China‘s defense industrial Renaissance.‖ Journal of 
Strategic Studies 32 (2009): 29-66. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1080/01402390802407418.  
Mishra, P. ―Narendra Modi and the new face of India.‖ The Guardian, May 16, 2014. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/16/what-next-india-pankaj-mishra. 
Mistry, D. ―US arms sales to India.‖ East-West Center: Asia Pacific Bulletin, July 8, 2014. Accessed 
July 20, 2015. http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb271.pdf. 
Mohan, R. ―India and the balance of power.‖ Foreign Affairs 85 (2006): 17-32. Accessed July 20, 
2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20032038.pdf. 
———. ―Modi‘s American engagement: Discarding the defensive mindset.‖ Institute of South Asian 
Studies Insights 203 (2015): 1-15. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/09/modi-s-american-engagement-discarding-defensive-
mindset. 
Mohanty, D. Arming the Indian arsenal. New Delhi: Rupa, 2009. 
Morgan, P. ―American military power and challenges to international security.‖ In From superpower 
to besieged global power: Restoring world order after the failure of the Bush doctrine, edited by 
Edward Kolodziej and Roger Kanet, 31-54. Athens, USA: University of Georgia Press, 2008. 
Mukherjee, A. ―Cleaning the Augean stables.‖ India Seminar 268, June 1, 2014. Accessed July 20, 
2015. http://www.india-seminar.com/2014/658/658_anit_mukherjee.htm. 
Mukherjee, A. and Thyagraj, M. ―Competing exceptionalisms: US-India defence relationship.‖ 
Journal of Defence Studies 6 (2012): 12-28. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.idsa.in/jds/6_2_2012_CompetingExceptionalisms_Anit.html. 
Mustafa, S. ―Non-alignment 2.0 need of the hour.‖ DNA India, March 2, 2012. Accessed July 20, 
2015. http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-non-alignment-20-need-of-the-hour-
1657268.―Myanmar may still get EU choppers.‖ Taipei Times, July 17, 2007. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2007/07/17/2003369968. 
Najan, R. And I. Stewart. ―Export controls and India.‖ Centre for Science & Security Studies 
Occasional Papers 1 (2013): 1-19. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/csss/pubs/India-export-
control.pdf. 
Nayan, R. ―Update on India‘s Membership of Multilateral Export Controls Regimes.‖ Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses Comment, December 19, 2012. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
 100 
 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/UpdateonIndiasMembershipofMultilateralExportControlsRegimes_r
nayan_191212.html. 
Neuman, S. ―Defense industries and global dependency.‖ Orbis 50 (2006): 429-451. Accessed July 5, 
2015. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2006.04.004. 
Noronha, J. ―Flying high: The bright future of India‘s military UAVs.‖ Indian Defence Review, 
February 18, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/flying-high-
the-bright-future-of-indias-military-uavs/. 
Novichkov, N. and Hardy, J. ―Russia ready to supply ‗standard‘ Su-35s to China, says official.‖ IHS 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 25, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.janes.com/article/46273/russia-ready-to-supply-standard-su-35s-to-china-says-official. 
Ogden, C. ―International ‗ aspirations‘ of a rising power.‖ in Handbook of India’s international 
relations, edited by David Scott, 3-13. London: Routledge, 2011. 
———. Hindu nationalism and the evolution of contemporary Indian security: Portents of power. 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198089551.001.0001. 
Omega Research Foundation. ―Indian helicopters for Myanmar: Making a mockery of the EU arms 
embargo?‖ Amnesty International and Saferworld (2007): 1-20. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/asa200142007en.pdf. 
Opall-Rome, B. ―IAI courts India with offsets, tech transfer.‖ Defense New, March 16, 2013. Accessed 
July 5, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/industry/2015/03/16/israel-
india-iai-trade-offsets-technology-export-russia-phalcon-/22843269/. 
Pal Singh, R. ―Recommendations on arms procurement reforms in India.‖ Observer Research 
Foundation Policy Paper 1 (2012): 1-34. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/occasionalpaper/attachments/Policy-
Paper_1349684216748.pdf. 
Palit, A. ―Economic drivers of India‘s external engagement strategy.‖ Institute of South Asian Studies 
Insights, April 27, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.eurasiareview.com/27042015-economic-
drivers-of-indias-external-engagement-strategy-analysis/. 
Panda, A. ―Will India lease another Russian nuclear submarine?‖ The Diplomat, March 30, 2015. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/will-india-lease-another-russian-nuclear-
submarine/. 
Panda, A. ―23 countries want India‘s help in Yemen evacuation operations.‖ The Diplomat, April 7, 
2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/23-countries-want-indias-help-in-
yemen-evacuation-operations/. 
Pande, S. ―Missile technology control regime: impact assessment.‖ Strategic Analysis 23 (1999): 923-
945. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1080/09700169908455096. 
Pandit, R. ―Hike in defence FDI cap fails to lure investors.‖ The Times of India, March 11, 2015. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Hike-in-defence-FDI-cap-fails-to-
lure-investors/articleshow/46522466.cms. 
———. ―India asks Japan if it‘s interested in Rs 50,000 crore submarine project.‖ Times of India, 
January 29, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-asks-Japan-if-
its-interested-in-Rs-50000-crore-submarine-project/articleshow/46049111.cms. 
101 
 
———. ―India now puts aircraft carrier plan on fast track.‖ The Times of India, February 23, 2015. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-now-puts-aircraft-carrier-plan-
on-fast-track/articleshow/46336472.cms. 
Pant, H. ―India‘s arms acquisition: devoid of a strategic orientation.‖ In The global arms trade: A 
handbook, edited by Andrew Tan, 65-77. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010. 
———. ―India‘s relations with China.‖ in Handbook of India’s international relation, edited by David 
Scott, 233-242. London: Routledge, 2011. 
———. ―India-Russia ties and India‘s strategic culture: Dominance of a realist worldview.‖ India 
Review 12 (2013): 1-19. Accessed July 5, 2015, doi: 10.1080/14736489.2013.759464.  
———. ―Indian strategic culture: The debate and its consequences.‖ In Handbook of India’s 
international relations, edited by David Scott, 14-22. London: Routledge, 2011. 
———. ―India-Russia ties and India‘s strategic culture: Dominance of a realist worldview.‖ India 
Review 12 (2013): 1-19. Accessed July 5, 2015, doi: 10.1080/14736489.2013.759464.  
———. ―The Pakistan thorn in the China-India-U.S. relations.‖ The Washington Quarterly 35 (2012): 
83-95. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1080/0163660X.2012.642294. 
———. The US-India nuclear pact: Policy, process, and great power politics. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. Accessed July 20, 2015. doi: 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198073963.001.0001.Pant, H. and Y. Joshi. ―Indian foreign policy responds 
to the U.S: pivot.‖ Asia Policy 19 (2015): 89-114. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1353/asp.2015.0012. 
Pant, H. and J. Super. ―India‘s ‗non-alignment‘ conundrum: A twentieth century policy in a changing 
world.‖ International Affairs 91 (2015): 747-764. Accessed July 20, 2015. doi: 10.1111/1468-
2346.12336. 
Percival, B. ―China, India and the United States: Tempered rivalries in Asia.‖ S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies Policy Brief (2013):1-12. Accessed July 20, 2015. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/PB131201_China_India_USA_Tempered_Rivalries.pdf. 
Peri, D. ―Defence at the heart of ‗Make in India.‘‖ The Hindu, February 19, 2015. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/defence-at-the-heart-of-make-in-
india/article6910517.ece. 
Prasad Routray, B. ―Armed forces versus technologists in India‘s military modernisation.‖ Defence 
studies 13 (2013): 33-55, Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1080/14702436.2013.774962. 
―Procurement Nadir: India‘s murky, messed-up Howitzer competition.‖ Defense Industry Daily, 
November 24, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/murky-
competition-for-2b-india-howitzer-order-may-end-soon-0805/. 
Raghundan, D. ―The key is technology, not money.‖ The Hindu, April 15, 2015. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/fdi-in-defence/article7102328.ece. 
Raghuvanshi, V. ―India compromises to smooth FGFA dispute.‖ Defense News Daily, June 16, 2015. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-
space/strike/2015/06/16/india-russia-fighter-fgfa-final-agreement-hal-uac-work-share-
indigenous/28730155/. 
———. ―India lifts ban on Denel.‖ Defense News, August 18, 2014. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140818/DEFREG03/308180006/India-Lifts-Ban-Denel. 
 102 
 
———. ―India may legalize agents for foreign firms, limit blacklisting.‖ Defense News, January 12, 
2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-
budget/industry/2015/01/11/india-agent-minesweeper-south-korea-blacklist/21330323/. 
———. India opts not to blacklist AgustaWestland.‖ Defense News, January 2, 2014. Accessed July 
20, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140102/DEFREG03/301020011/. 
———. ―India to limit ships buy to domestic yards.‖ Defense News Daily, May 2, 2015. Accessed 
July 20, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/05/02/india-ship-submarine-overseas-
navy-domestic-shipyard-indigenous-destroyer-corvette/26631375/. 
Ranjan Sen, S. ―Government‘s new defence rules: Less blacklisting, more penalties.‖ NDTV, February 
24, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/governments-new-defence-rules-
less-blacklisting-more-penalties-741926. 
———. ―Japan on agenda as US Defence secretary Ashton Carter meets Union Minister Manohar 
Parrikar today.‖ NDTV, June 3, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/japan-
on-agenda-as-us-defence-secretary-ashton-carter-meets-union-minister-manohar-parrikar-today-
768251. 
Rault, Y. ―France and India: Decoding the strategic partnership.‖ Institute of Peace and Conflict 
Studies Special Report 147 (2013): 1-16. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR147-Yves-IndiaFrance.pdf. 
Rekha, C. ―Synergies in Indo-Russia Defence Cooperation Since 2000.‖ Defence and Diplomacy 3 
(2014): 25-34. Accessed July 5, 2015. https://www.academia.edu/9622036/SYNERGIES_IN_INDO-
RUSSIA_DEFENCE_COOPERATION_SINCE_2000. 
Rethinaraj, T. ―India‘s nuclear weaponization: Warheads, delivery systems, and doctrinal 
compatibility.‖ In India’s military modernization: Strategic technologies and weapon systems, edited 
by Rajesh Basrur and Bharath Gopalaswamy, 67-88. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Rigual, C. ―Trade Update: Authorized Small Arms Transfers Annex 8.1.‖Online annex to Small Arms 
Survey 2013: Everyday dangers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2013.html. 
Rodkiewicz, W. ―The turn to the East: The flawed diversification of Russian foreign policy.‖ Ośrodek 
Studiów Wschodnich 44 (2014): 1-35. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://aei.pitt.edu/58860/.  
―Russian aircraft carrier ready in 2012 if India pays 2 bln more.‖ Sputnik, November 13, 2008. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://sputniknews.com/russia/20081113/118299115.html. 
―Russian-built nuclear submarine joins Indian navy.‖ BBC News, April 4, 2012. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-17606829. 
Safi, M. ―Australian uranium ‗could end up in India‘s nuclear weapons program.‖ The Guardian, 
February 13, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/oct/03/australias-uranium-deal-with-india-risks-
weakening-safeguards. 
Sagan, S. and K. Waltz. The spread of nuclear weapons: An enduring debate. New York: Nolton & 
Company, 2013. 
Saghal, A. and V. Anand. ―Strategic environment in Central Asia and India.‖ In Reconnecting India 
and Central Asia. Emerging security and economic dimensions, edited by Nirmala Joshi, 33-80. 
Washington: The Central Asia and Caucasus Institute and Stockholm: The Silk Road Studies Program, 
2010. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
103 
 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/Monographs/2010_03_MONO_Joshi_India-Central-
Asia.pdf. 
Saint-Mézard, I. ―The French strategy in the Indian Ocean and the potential for Indo-French 
cooperation.‖ S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Policy Report (2015), 1-12. Accessed 
July 5, 2015. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PR150312_French-Strategy.pdf. 
Samanta P. and M. Pubby. ―France offers 25% discount to India on purchase of 36 Rafale jets.‖ The 
Economic Times, May 6, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rafale-deal-india-france-set-up-teams-to-work-out-
details/articleshow/47174671.cms. 
Sarkar, J. ―India and Israel‘s secret love affair.‖ The National Interest, December 10, 2014. Accessed 
July 5, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/india-israels-secret-love-affair-11831. 
Sato, H. ―Japan‘s arms export and defense production policy.‖ Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, April 1, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://cogitasia.com/japans-arms-export-defense-
production-policy/. 
Seemangal, R, ―Disaster diplomacy: After Nepal earthquake, China and India raice to give aid.‖ 
Observer, May 1, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://observer.com/2015/05/in-nepal-china-and-
india-engage-in-disaster-diplomacy/. 
Sharma, R. ―Russia‘s defence pact with Pak shows Modi govt‘s diplomatic failure.‖ First Post, 
November 24, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.firstpost.com/world/implications-india-russia-
signs-defence-pact-pakistan-1816957.html. 
Sharma, V. ―Defence procurement: A conundrum.‖ Centre for Land Warfare Studies (2013): 115:130. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1394685336Vinay%20Sharma%20CJ%20Summer%202013
.pdf. 
Simha, R. ―Arming India: Russia tools up.‖ Russia & India Report, October 8, 2012. Accessed July 5, 
2015. http://in.rbth.com/articles/2012/10/08/arming_india_russia_tools_up_18205.html. 
———. ―Building India‘s defence base: Offset vs. Joint development.‖ Russia & India Report, 
October 2, 2012. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://in.rbth.com/articles/2012/10/02/building_indias_defence_base_offsets_vs_joint_development_1
8039.html. 
Singh, B. ―Defence indigenisation: Made in India, by India, for India.‖ Centre for Land Warfare 
Studies (2013): 248-258. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/16092657_BikramdeepSingh.pdf. 
Singh, J. ―India ‗looking East‘ via military diplomacy.‖ Institute of South Asian Studies Insights 268, 
October 29, 2014. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Insights_268_-
_India_%27Looking_East%27_via_Military_Diplomacy_29102014155029.pdf. 
———. ―Indo-Russian defence trade: Recipe for revival.‖ Institute of South Asian Studies Insights 
242 (2014): 1-6. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Insights_242_-_Indo-
Russian_Defence_Trade__A_Recipe_for_Revival_07042014112807.pdf.  
Singh, S. ―SIPRI data shows India world‘s biggest arms importer at three times of China.‖ The Indian 
Express, March 16, 2015. Accessed July 4, 2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-
others/india-remains-worlds-biggest-arms-importer--sipri/. 
 104 
 
Singh, Z. ―Flashback: Non-alignment 2.0.‖ Pragati, March 2, 2012. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2012/03/flashback-non-alignment-2-0/. 
Srivastava, S. ―India‘s strategic and political environment.‖ In India’s contemporary security 
challenges, edited by Michael Kugelman, 69-76. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars, 2011. 
Stobdan, P. ―Is Russia relevant for India?‖ IDSA Comment, December 8, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IsRussiaRelevantforIndia_pstobdan_081214.html.  
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Arms trade and the third world. Uppsala: Almqvist 
& Wiksells, 1971. 
Stohl, R. and S. Grillot. The international arms trade. Cambrige: Polity Press, 2009. 
Sullivan, K. ―Is India a responsible nuclear power?‖ S. Rarjaratnam School of International Studies 
(2014): 1-9. Accessed July 20, 2015. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/is-india-a-
responsible-nuclear/. 
Suman, M. ―Defence production and acquisitions: Enhancing capabiliy through an integrated 
approach.‖ Center for Land Warfare Studies (2013): 131-149. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1394685381Mrinal%20Suman%20CJ%20Summer%202013
.pdf. 
———. ―Indo-US military trade: A decade of wasted opportunities,‖ Indian Defence Review 27 
(2012): 67-73. 
Suroor, S. ―U.K. to back India‘s membership of export control regimes.‖ The Hindu, June 29, 2011. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/uk-to-back-indias-membership-of-
export-control-regimes/article2145046.ece. 
―Sweden backs India‘s bid for entry into Missile Technology Control Regime.‖ The Economic Times, 
June 2, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/sweden-
backs-indias-bid-for-entry-into-missile-technology-control-regime/articleshow/47514397.cms. 
Takenaka, K. ―Japan relaxes arms export regime to fortify defense.‖ Reuters, April 1, 2014. Accessed 
July 5, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/us-japan-defence-
idUSBREA2U1VF20140401.  
Taneja, K. ―The trouble with India‘s MiG-21 fighter jets.‖ New York Times, August 8, 2013. Accessed 
July 5, 2015. http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/the-trouble-with-indian-air-forces-mig-21-
fighter-jets. 
———. ―Why is Russia, India‘s closest ally, making overtures to Pakistan?‖ Scroll.in, December 10, 
2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://scroll.in/article/694034/why-is-russia-indias-closest-ally-making-
overtures-to-pakistan. 
Tanham, G. Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay. Santa Monica: RAND, 1992. 
Tellis, A. Dogfight. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2010. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf. 
———. Unity in difference: Overcoming the U.S.-India divide. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2015. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/unity_in_difference.pdf. 
105 
 
The White House. ―U.S.-India Joint Statement           -           ‖ – ‗Shared Effort; Progress 
for All.‘‖ Press release, January 25, 2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all. 
Tiezzi, S. ―China, India end military stand-off along disputed border.‖ The Diplomat, October 1, 2014. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/china-india-end-military-stand-off-along-
disputed-border/. 
Topychkanov, P. ―Can Russia sell arms to both India and Pakistan?‖ Carnegie Moscow Center, June 
6, 2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=55823. 
Topychkanov, P. ―Will Mi-35M helicopters fly to Pakistan?‖ Carnegie Moscow Center, November 26, 
2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=57325. 
Trenin, D. ―Challenges and opportunities: Russia and the rise of China and India.‖ In Strategic Asia 
2011-2012: Asia responds to its rising powers: China and India, edited by Ashley Tellis, Travis 
Tanner and Jessica Keough, 227-258. Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012. 
Twining, D. ―Why isn‘t India buying American fighter jets.‖ Foreign Policy, April 29, 2011. Accessed 
July 20, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/29/why-isnt-india-buying-american-fighter-jets/. 
―Unravelling Gorshkov,‖ DNA India, April 13, 2010. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/editorial-unravelling-gorshkov-1371042. 
Upadhyay, D. ―Unlike Russia, Ukraine continues arms supplies to Pakistan.‖ Russia & India Report, 
February 25, 2013. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://in.rbth.com/world/2013/02/25/unlike_russia_ukraine_continues_arms_supplies_to_pakistan_225
29. 
Vries, W. de and M. Akkerman. ―Analyse Nederlandse wapenexport 2013 [Analysis Dutch arms 
exports 2013].‖ Campagne Stop de Wapenhandel (2014): 1-16. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.stopwapenhandel.org/sites/stopwapenhandel.org/files/analyse2013-def.pdf. 
Vucetic, S. and E. Duarte. ―New fighter aircraft acquisitions in Brazil and India: Why not buy 
American?‖ Politics and Policy 4 (2015): 401-425. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1111/polp.12119. 
Waltz, K. ―Structural realism after the Cold War.‖ International Security 25 (2000): 5-41. Accessed 
July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1162/016228800560372. 
Weidlich, C., J. Altmann, I. Anastasakis, R. Pedatzur, O. Shulga, P. Stroh, P. Wezeman. ―Unmanned 
aerial vehicles: A challenge to a WMD/DVs free zone in the Middle East.‖ Academic Peace Orchestra 
Middle East Policy Brief 8 (2012): 1-8. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/09608.pdf. 
Weitz, R. ―The maturing of Russia-India defence relations.‖ Journal of Defence Studies 6 (2012): 75-
98. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://www.idsa.in/jds/6_3_2012_TheMaturingofRussiaIndiaDefenceRelations_RichardWeitz. 
 ―Will never do anything detrimental to India‘s security: Russia.‖ The Indian Express, December 8, 
2014. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-others/will-never-do-
anything-detrimental-to-indias-security-russia/#sthash.pHZMuVEU.dpuf. 
Winner, A. ―The United States, India, the Indian ocean, and maritime elements of security 
cooperation.‖ In India’s contemporary security challenges, edited by Michael Kugelman, 99-118. 
Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011. 
 106 
 
Wright, T. ―Non-alignment rises from the dustbin of history.‖ Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2012. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/03/22/non-alignment-rises-from-
dustbin-of-history/. 
Xinmin, S. ―India‘s strategic culture and model of international behaviour.‖ China Institute of 
International Studies, June 25, 2014. Accessed July 20, 2015. http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-
06/25/content_7007616.htm. 
Yoon, S. ―Middle-power cooperation between South Korea and India.‖ Center for Strategic and 
International Studies Pacific Forum, January 28, 2014. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=191528&lng=en. 
Zezima, K. ―Why Obama‘s trip to India‘s Republic Day is a big deal.‖ Washington Post, January 24, 
2015. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/01/24/why-
obamas-trip-to-indias-republic-day-is-a-big-deal/. 
Åkerman, A. And A. Larsson Seim. ―The global arms trade network 1950-2007.‖ Journal of 
comparative economics 42 (2014): 535-551. Accessed July 5, 2015. doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2014.03.001. 
9.1 Databases and websites 
“Casspir.‖ Army Guide. Accessed July 5, 2015. http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product1130.html. 
―Export Import Data Bank Version 7.2.‖ Indian Department of Commerce. Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnttopnq.asp. 
―Fact Sheet on foreign direct investment,‖ Indian Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion. 
Accessed July 20, 2015. 
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/FDI_Statistics/2015/india_FDI_January2015.pdf. 
―Rajya Sabha Questions.‖ Rajya Sabha. Accessed July 5, 2015. 
http://164.100.47.5/qsearch/qsearch.aspx. 
―P-81 Multimission Maritime Patrol Aircraft,‖ Naval-technology.com, accessed July 20, 2015, 
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/p-8i-maritime-patrol-aircraft-india/. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. ―SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.‖ 
Accessed July 4, 2015.  http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/armstransfers.  
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. ―SIPRI Arms Transfers Database – Methodology.‖ 
Accessed July 4, 2015. http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. ―Military Expenditure Database.‖ Accessed July 20, 
2015. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. ―World Nuclear Forces.‖ Accessed July 20, 
2015. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/nuclear-forces. 
―World Reaction to the Indian Nuclear Tests.‖ James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies. 
Accessed July 5, 2015. http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/wreactpk.htm. 
